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ARTICLE
STRATEGIES OF PUBLIC UDAP ENFORCEMENT
PRENTISS Cox, AMY WIDMAN

&

MARK TorrEN*

Abstract: Laws protecting consumers from unfair and deceptive acts and
practices-commonly called "UDAP" laws-have played a stunning role in recent years. State and federal enforcers plied these laws more than any other to
hold individuals and companies accountable for the Great Recession, while
chalking up record payouts.
Given the outsized role these statutes play, critics have directed their sights
on both the laws and the enforcers who wield them. Missing from this debate,
however, is an account of the actual conduct of UDAP enforcement in America.
How do public UDAP enforcers exercise their considerable discretion? This article examines every UDAP matter resolved by state and federal enforcers in
2014 and presents the initial results of the first comprehensive empirical study of
public UDAP enforcement.
Across a range of attributes, public UDAP enforcement varies while also
revealing clear patterns. We organize the data to show how enforcers employ
distinct strategies. The two main federal enforcers adopt sharply different approaches, especially regarding targets and relief The state enforcers divide into
seven distinct strategies, distinguished not only by case variables, but also by
case quantity and leadership in multi-enforcer actions. The picture that emerges
should shape the policy and scholarly debate on public UDAP enforcement and
help optimize the work of public enforcers.
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INTRODUCTION

In the hands of public enforcers, laws protecting consumers from unfair
and deceptive acts and practices---commonly called "UDAP" laws-have
played a stunning role in recent years. State and federal enforcers plied these
laws more than any other to hold individuals and companies accountable for
the Great Recession.' When Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") in 2010 to prevent future crises, the agency's single most important weapon was the power to prevent "unfair, deceptive, or
abusive act[s] or practice[s]."2 UDAP laws have chalked up record-setting
payouts against some of the nation's most powerful companies, including the

1
See Mark Totten, The Enforcers & the Great Recession, 36
1654 (2015).
2
12 U.S.C. § 553 l(a) (2012).

CARDOZO
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$181 million Risperdal Settlement3 and the $50 billion National Mortgage
Settlement. 4 Moreover, as state attorneys general ("AGs") have ascended to
national prominence in recent years, altering the balance of federalism in
America, UDAP powers have arguably defined the role and reach of this
office more than anything else. 5
The spotlight on these laws shows no signs of dimming. The new Administration has promised to weaken, if not wipe out, the CFPB and its
UDAP power, setting up a bitter contest between the agency's friends and
foes. 6 As happened in the years leading up to the financial crisis, some state
enforcers are banding together, using their UDAP laws to police the marketplace and fill the gaps left by waning federal enforcement. 7 Moreover, with
growing constraints on the private consumer class action, public enforcement of UDAP laws may increase as a means of consumer redress. 8 These
developments will fix a steady beam on public UDAP enforcement.
3
Press Release, Ariz. Att'y Gen., Home Announces Largest Multi-State Pharmaceutical
Settlement over Alleged Improper Marketing (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.azag.gov/pressrelease/home-announces-largest-multi-state-pharmaceutical-settlement-over-alleged-improper
[https://perma.cc/MH37-V6KS].
4
See Settlement Documents, JOINT STATE-FED. NAT'L MoRTG. SERVICING SEITLEMENTS,
http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/settlement-documents [https://perma.cc/W8ZZ5FRG] (collecting documents, including the complaint and the consent judgments).
5
See PAUL NOLE'ITE, FEDERALISM ON ThIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL
POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 19-30 (2015); Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics
and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL.
525, 535-36 (1994 ); Lynn Mather, The Politics of Litigation by State Attorneys General: Introduction to Mini-Symposium, 25 LAW & PoL'Y 425, 425-26 (2003); Colin L. Provost, State
Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism, 33
Puauus 37, 43-44 (2003) [hereinafter Provost, Entrepreneurship]; Colin L. Provost, The
Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General Participation in MultiState Lawsuits, 59 POL. RES. Q. 609, 610-12 (2006) [hereinafter Provost, Politics].
6
See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Consumer Protection Bureau Chief Braces for a Reckoning,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2016, at B 1, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/24/business/consumerprotection-bureau-chief-braces-for-a-reckoning.html [https://perma.cc/Z38S-UUS8]; Suzanne
O'Halloran, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fights to Stay Alive under Trump, Fox
Bus. (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/2017/0l/27/consumer-financialprotection-bureau-fights-to-stay-alive-under-trump.html [https://perma.cc/24PU-G8EG]; Lucinda Shen, Donald Trump ls Targeting an Agency That Has Recovered $11.8 Billion for Consumers, FoRTUNE (Jan. 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/0l/27/donald-trump-cfpbconsumer-protection-financial-bureau-elizabeth-warren/ [https://perma.ccN4AG-N3ANJ.
7
See Alexander Bums, How Attorneys General Became Democrats' Bulwark Against
Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2017, at A9, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/us/attomeysgeneral-democrats-trump-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/5W7R-DFKW]; Laura Krantz &
Jim O'Sullivan, Blue-state Attorneys General Lead Trump Resistance, Bos. GLOBE (Feb. 7,
2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/massachusetts/2017 /02/06/state-ags-lead-chargeagainst-trump/LCHc5CQrZMzV 1JUd4c027M/story .html [https://perma.cc/YCT5-CNFL].
8
See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. Cm. L. REv. 623, 660 (2012) ("In our view, state
attorneys general-alone among public enforcers-have the ability to fill the void left by class
actions .... "); Deborah R. Hensler, Goldilocks and the Class Action, 126 HARV. L. REv. F.
56, 56-57 (2012) (describing the need for public enforcement to fill the gap left by the decline
in private class actions). See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90
WASH. U. L. REv. 729 (2013) (surveying many ways courts and legislatures have weakened
the private class action).
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Given everything at stake, it comes as no surprise that critics have directed their sights on UDAP laws and the enforcers who wield them. The
most outspoken critics are advocates for industries that public UDAP enforcers target. 9 According to them, state attorneys general employ these laws to
achieve political goals, outsourcing public litigation to private plaintiffs'
lawyers who fund their campaigns and then grabbing headlines with large
monetary awards. 10 These enforcers, the critics allege, devise novel theories
of liability that no target could anticipate. 11 Enforcers then coerce settlements and effectively serve as prosecutor, judge, and jury. 12 As a result, the
critics charge, public enforcers usurp the legislative role with closed-door
settlements that effectively regulate an entire industry and produce payouts
that fund programs outside the appropriation process. 13 And to top it off, the
enforcers pile on-a tactic the critics call "swarm litigation." 14
More recently, scholars have voiced some of these concerns as well.
Over the past several years, a distinct conversation on public civil enforcement has emerged. 15 The participants have often focused on UDAP laws to
explore the contours of public enforcement. For example, some scholars
have argued that state AGs are not adequate representatives when obtaining
money for consumers in public UDAP enforcement because of conflicts of
interest inherent in their office. 16 Strikingly absent, however, is real-world
data to evaluate public UDAP enforcement. As Deborah Hensler observes,
the scholarly arguments are often "heavy on theory and light on empirics." 17
The problem is not a missing footnote. Until now, wide-ranging data on
public UDAP enforcement did not exist.
This data is critical, however, for at least two reasons. At a theoretical
level, normative accounts of public enforcement that lack an accurate
description of the activity they purport to expound risk irrelevance and invite
error. At a practical level, achieving effective and efficient public enforcement demands first understanding how public enforcers use their powers.
This article presents the initial results of the first empirical study of
public UDAP enforcement across state and federal governments. We ex-

9
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, UNPRINCIPLED PROSECUTION: ABUSE
or POWER AND PROFITEERING IN THE NEW "LITIGATION SWARM" (2014) [hereinafter UNPRINCIPLED PROSECUTION]; U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ENFORCEMENT SLUSH
FUNDS: FUNDING FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES WITH ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDS (2015).
10
See UNPRINCIPLED PROSECUTION, supra note 9, at 7-11.
11
See id. at 14-16.
12
See id. at 17.
13
See id. at 17-20.
14
See id. at 3, 22.
15
See Hensler, supra note 8, at 58; Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 512-18 (2012)
[hereinafter Lemos, Aggregate Litigation]; Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal
Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 722-23 (2011) [hereinafter Lemos, State Enforcement].
16
See, e.g., Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 15, at 512-18; see also Lemos, State
Enforcement, supra note 15, at 722-23.
17 Hensler, supra note 8, at 58.
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amine 798 cases: every UDAP matter resolved by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the CFPB, state attorneys general, and state consumer
protection agencies in 2014, whether working alone or in cooperation with
each other. 18 Our study covers cases resolved not only by formal administrative or judicial processes, but also by settlement. No previous study focused
on UDAP, or any other area of public civil enforcement, has provided this
comprehensive, national snapshot of state-level enforcement nor placed the
state and federal data side-by-side. For each case we code for nearly 200
distinct variables that include, but are not limited to, the forum, the parties,
the claims, the alleged harms, the product or service at issue, and the nature
of the relief obtained.
Our aim is to describe public UDAP enforcement in the United States.
We attempt to answer a single question: How do public enforcers exercise
their considerable discretion to enforce UDAP laws? Although explaining
the causes for different enforcement outcomes is an important next step, it is
not our task here. No one has previously collected comprehensive state and
federal data on public UDAP enforcement, so we focus in this paper on
describing the enforcement landscape.
Across a range of attributes, UDAP enforcement by state and federal
actors varies while also revealing clear patterns. We organize the data to
show how enforcers employ distinct strategies. The two main federal enforcers adopt sharply different approaches, especially regarding targets and relief. The state enforcers divide into several groups, distinguished not only by
these and other case variables, but also by case quantity and leadership in
multi-enforcer actions.
In Part II we provide a brief overview of public UDAP enforcement,
tracing its historical origins and explaining its structural features. We tum in
Part ill to review the relevant scholarship, locating our subject within a
broader discussion on civil enforcement. Part IV outlines our study design,
including our methodology and our rationales for drawing certain lines. In
the final three parts we tum to the data. Part V summarizes our findings at
the aggregate level. In Part VI we identify distinct enforcement strategies.
And, finally, in Part VII we briefly examine the implications of this study for
conceptions of public enforcement, the exercise of public UDAP authority,
and further research.
II.

UDAP BASICS

While its fingerprints are everywhere, the basics of UDAP law are less
familiar. This Part sketches the rise of UDAP law in America and reviews its
key marks.

18

See infra

PART

IV,

METHODOLOGY.
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The Rise of VDAP Law

UDAP laws are a central component of state and federal consumer protection law. They arrived as an alternative to common law remedies in tort
and contract, which proved inadequate for addressing fraud in a progressively more complex marketplace. 19 Congress passed the first UDAP statute
in 1938, prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce" 20
and giving the FfC enforcement power. 21 Stakeholders commonly refer to
the law as "Section 5." Although Congress never empowered the agency to
enforce the prohibition against banks, 22 the FfC has authority over a broad
range of markets.
Beginning in the 1960s, states began to adopt similar laws. 23 Worries
about regulatory capture, limited agency capacity, a growing consumer
movement, and the absence of a private right of action in Section 5 all fueled
this development. By 1981 every state had a consumer protection act. 24 In
the vast majority of states and the District of Columbia, the attorney general
has exclusive public enforcement power under the state UDAP, although in a
few states this authority resides in, or is shared with, another agency. 25 Un19
Common law remedies included breach of contract, unconscionability, fraud, and fraudulent misrepresentation. For analysis of these remedies and their limits, see Henry N. Butler &
Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 163, 168--69 (2011); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction
of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 KAN. L. REV. I, 6--7 (2005); Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust!
Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216,
2226--27 (2012).
20
Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, sec. 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(I) (2012)).
21
See 52 Stat. at 111-12 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012)).
22
For a summary of agency jurisdiction to enforce UDAP against banks, see Mark Totten,
Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General after Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA
L. REV. 115, 120 (2013).
23
See Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 663, 674-77 (2008); Butler & Wright, supra note 19, at 167-73 (identifying different
types of state consumer protection acts); Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 19, at 15-32.
24
See MARY DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
LAW app. 3A (2016) (listing state consumer protection statutes, including date of enactment
and citation); Butler & Wright, supra note 19, at 169.
25
Connecticut gives the Commissioner of the Department of Consumer Protection sole
discretion to bring a UDAP action, although the state's AG litigates cases before the judiciary
on behalf of the Commissioner. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1 !0m(a) (West, Westlaw
through the 2016 Sept. Special Sess.). Although Georgia previously granted the Georgia Office of Consumer Protection exclusive public enforcement power, the legislature transferred
that power to the state AG in 2015. See 2015 Ga. Laws 187 (codified at GA. CooE ANN. §§ 101-390-408 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Legis. Sess.)) (effective July 1, 2015). Hawaii gives
the state AG and a separate consumer protection agency concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the
state UDAP. See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 480-20(c) (West, Westlaw through Act I (end) of
the 2016 Second Special Sess.). In practice, the agency handles most UDAP enforcement action and the state AG participates in a case-by-case basis. Letter from Deborah Day Demerson,
Deputy Att'y Gen., State of Haw., to Prentiss Cox, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch.
(July 16, 2015) (on file with authors) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Utah
places exclusive public enforcement power in the hands of the Utah Department of Commerce,
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like Section 5, state UDAP statutes all create a private right of action and
provide for attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs. 26
Congress expanded federal UDAP enforcement in 2010 with passage of
the Dodd-Frank Act. 27 Among other reforms, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 28 and empowered the new agency to enforce a broad prohibition on "unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or
practice[s]" ("UDAAP"). 29 The agency has enforcement power against any
person or entity that offers or provides a consumer financial product or service. 30 While the UDAP language is familiar, Congress included the novel
term "abusive," 31 which the agency has cautiously applied. 32 Moreover, like
Section 5, the new UDAAP provision lacks a private right of action.
In sum, UDAP law reflects nearly eighty years of evolution in American consumer protection. At least three distinct UDAP laws cover every consumer today: two federal statutes and at least one state statute. Moreover, as
discussed below, these laws empower four types of public enforcers: the
FTC; the CFPB; various state AGs; and, in a few states, a separate consumer
protection agency. 33

Division of Consumer Protection. See UTAH CooE ANN. § 13-11-3(3) (West, Westlaw through
2016 Fourth Special Sess.) (defining the "[e]nforcing authority" to mean the "Division of
Consumer Protection"). Wisconsin is similar to Hawaii. Under the first of two UDAP statutes,
the state AG and the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection have concurrent jurisdiction, with a requirement that the state AG "consult" with the agency before filing a
judicial complaint. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.18(1 l)(a), (d), (e) (West, Westlaw through 2015
Act 392). This first statute prohibits "untrue, deceptive or misleading" representations. Id.
§ 100.18(1). Under the second UDAP statute, the agency has full enforcement power, see id.
§ 100.20(6), and the state AG can file an administrative complaint with the agency and later
seek judicial review, see id.§ 100.20(4). This second statute prohibits "unfair trade practices."
See id. § 100.20(1).
26
See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical Analysis of Attorney's Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 483,
494-95 (2008). For this and other advantages, see Budnitz, supra note 23, at 674-77; Butler &
Wright, supra note 19, at 167-73; Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 19, at 15-32.
27
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
28
See 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012).
29
Id. § 5531 (a). For an overview of CFPB enforcement power, see Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TuL.
L. REv. 1057, 1064-73 (2016); Totten, supra note 22, at 125-28.
30
See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2012). For a list of covered financial products and services,
see id. § 5481(15).
31
For the statutory definition of "abusive," see id. § 553l(d).
32
See Peterson, supra note 29, at 1099-1101. Peterson notes that from 2010 to 2015,
cases alleging "abusive" practices accounted for only 11.5% of the Bureau's docket and only
I% of total consumer relief. See id. at 1100.
33
Two other public enforcers have limited power to enforce UDAP laws. Although not
their primary mission, federal prudential bank regulators can enforce UDAP laws as part of
their supervisory role. Among depositories with less than $10 billion in assets, the prudential
regulator retains exclusive enforcement authority. See 12 U.S.C. § 5516(d) (2012). Moreover,
a few state consumer protection acts grant enforcement power to cities, counties, or district
attorneys. See Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1903, 1906 nn.9-10 (2013).
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The Marks of UDAP Law

At least four attributes characterize this body of law. First, UDAP laws
are generally applicable to personal consumer transactions involving products and services. These laws use various terms to designate the covered
object of consumption, such as "goods," "services," "merchandise," 34 or
any acts or practices connected to "trade or commerce." 35 Most statutes generously define these terms, 36 giving enforcers broad powers to police the
marketplace. 37
Second, the central prohibition on unfair and deceptive acts or practices
reflects the legislative choice of a principle (often called a standard) over a
rule. 38 The fact that UDAP laws give rise to principle-based enforcement is
central to this study, as explained in Part IV. 39 Although "unfair" and "deceptive" are the most recognizable terms, the various laws sometimes use
related words to indicate the proscribed conduct, including acts or practices
that are "unconscionable," "untrue," "misleading," "fraudulent," "false,"
"confusing," or "abusive."40 These terms are classic examples of principlebased norms.
34
See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 44-1521-22 (2016) (applying UDAP to "merchandise," defined to cover "any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real estate or
services"); OH10 REv. CODE ANN.§ 4165.02 (West 2016) (prohibiting fraud "in the course of
the person's business, vocation, or occupation" that relates to "goods or services").
35
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (2012) (prohibiting "unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce" (emphasis added)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204(1) (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Second Regular Session of the Twenty-Fourth Legislature) (prohibiting "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce" (emphasis added));
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-906 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.)
(same).
36
See, e.g., 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/l(f) (2016) (defining "trade" and

~'commerce'').
37
Many of these laws exempt certain areas of the market. See NAT'L CONSUMER LAw
CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTs ANo PRACTICES § 2.1.l (8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter
NCLC, UDAP].
38
We use the term principle to describe the type of legislative command that UDAP laws
represent. Ronald Dworkin introduces a distinction between a principle and a policy as two
types of standards. He explains:

I shall call a 'policy' that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally
an improvement in some economic, political, or social feature of the community
.... I call a 'principle' a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance
or secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it
is a requirement of justice or fairness of some other dimension of morality.
Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 22-23 (1967); see also James
J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Laws, 100 CAUF. L.
REv. 115 (2012) (applying same distinction). This description of a principle as a broad "requirement of justice or fairness" accurately describes the prohibition at the center of UDAP
laws.
39
See infra III.A. I.
40
See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 8-19-5(27) (2016) (prohibiting "any other unconscionable, false,
misleading, or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of trade or commerce"); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 367.170 (West 2017) (prohibiting "[u]nfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts
or practices," and defining "unfair" to mean "unconscionable"); 73 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
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As Louis Kap low explains, the difference between a principle (or what
he calls a standard) and a rule turns on "the extent to which efforts to give
content to the law are undertaken before or after individual acts." 41 A rule
identifies specific conduct and leaves the enforcer little discretion as to what
conduct the law covers. A principle, however, grants broad discretion to the
enforcer (and ultimately, to the courts). As a result, UDAP enforcers can
respond to ever-changing practices that may harm consumers, without returning to the legislature every time a new scheme hatches. While this flexibility is critical to consumer protection, principles can incur costs. Broad
discretion can mean that enforcement of the law is less predictable and consistent, especially when the law empowers multiple enforcers. 42
Understanding a law means understanding how enforcers exercise their
discretion under that law. With few exceptions, both rules and principles
leave the enforcer with discretion on whether to enforce. Principles, however, grant the enforcer considerable discretion on how to enforce. As a result, while there is always a difference between the "law on the books" and
the "law in action" (to borrow Roscoe Pound's phrase), 43 the difference is
more pronounced when the law on the books is a principle. As this study
demonstrates with principle-based UDAP law, enforcer discretion profoundly shapes outcomes.
Third, all UDAP laws grant public enforcement authority to a particular
government enforcer. Federal UDAP laws empower the FTC and the CFPB,
while state UDAP laws typically designate the state attorney general. These
UDAP enforcers sometimes cooperate with each other, 44 although multi-enforcer cases account for a relatively small percentage of UDAP actions. 45
States cooperate with other states, and one or more states cooperate with one
or more federal agencies.
The UDAP enforcer can engage in pre-complaint discovery using a
civil investigative demand ("CID"). 46 Even when a UDAP statute does not
grant this right, another statute47 or the state's common law may create it. 48
Federal enforcers have a similar power. 49 This tool, held by the public but
not the private enforcer, can prove critical for building a case and reaching a

§ 201-2(4)(xxi) (West 2016) (defining UDAP to include "any other fraudulent or deceptive
conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding").
41
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L. J. 557, 560
(1992).
42
See supra text accompanying note 38.
43
See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12

(1910).
44
See Totten, supra note 1, at 1643-44 (describing the rise of multi-government actions in
response to the Great Recession).
45
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
46
See NCLC, UDAP, supra note 37, § 13.3.
47
See, e.g., CAL. Gov'r CooE § 11180 (West 2016).
48
See, e.g., People v. Crawford Distrib. Co., 291 N.E.2d 648, 656 (Ill. 1972).
49
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c) (2012) (CFPB Cills); 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2012) (FTC
"6(b) orders"); 15 U.S.C. § 57b-l (2012) (FTC CIDs).
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settlement outside of court. Once the public enforcer is ready to proceed,
UDAP laws typically permit multiple enforcement channels. Public enforcers can negotiate informal pre-complaint agreements, often called assurances
of voluntary compliance ("AVCs"), which require judicial filing in some
states and not others. In some cases, public enforcers can conduct formal
administrative proceedings or issue cease and desist orders. In addition, public enforcers sometimes file a judicial complaint and consent judgment simultaneously, and sometimes proceed to litigate in a contested matter.
Fourth, and finally, UDAP laws allow public enforcers to seek multiple
remedies. This study gives considerable attention to UDAP remedies, which
accounted for more than 75% of the variables we coded. These remedies fall
into three types: injunctive relief; public compensation; and government
money. While, strictly speaking, injunctive relief is a remedy available only
through the courts, we use the term broadly to mean any relief that prospectively regulates a defendant's conduct, whether issued by a court, an agency,
or agreed upon in the terms of a settlement or AVC. Injunctive relief can
take many forms, ranging from prohibiting certain representations to a ban
on doing business in the jurisdiction.
Public compensation encompasses any relief provided to harmed consumers. so This relief, sometimes called restitution, includes both payments to
consumers and non-money relief, such as contract rescission, amendment to
a credit report, or an agreement to cease debt collection. For purposes of this
study, injunctive relief aims to prevent future harms, while public compensation is remedial. Finally, government money includes any money payments
that do not compensate harmed consumers. This relief can also take many
forms, including a civil penalty, compensation for fees and costs, or a cy
pres award, which typically involves the court distributing settlement funds
to a charity that will advance the interests of the harmed consumers when
individual compensation is not possible. In some cases, government money
is imposed but the order or settlement does not designate a specific purpose.
With slight variations, state and federal enforcers have broad powers to
mix and match these remedies. The state enforcer can always negotiate any
type of relief for settlement and the courts generally have broad authority to
issue an injunction, require public compensation, or impose some form of
government money.st Outside of settlement negotiations, most state enforc5
° For a taxonomy of state and federal public compensation schemes, see generally Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, 100 MINN. L. REv. 2313
(2016).
51
All state UDAP laws empower courts to grant injunctive relief. See NCLC, UDAP,
supra note 37, § 13.5.1.1. Likewise, nearly all state UDAP laws permit public compensation.
See id. § 13.5.4.1. Even if the statute is silent most courts nonetheless grant public compensation on the basis of their equitable powers. See id. § 13.5.4.1. n. A majority of state UDAP
laws allow courts to impose civil penalties for initial violations, although some laws require a
showing of purpose or knowledge. See id. §§ 13.5.3.1, 13.5.3.4. Although not every state
UDAP law expressly allows for fees, the state can probably seek fees under a general statute.
See id.
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ers lack power to impose these forms of relief through an administrative
process. A minority of states grant the enforcer power to issue cease and
desist orders52 and a few state enforcers can also require public compensation outside the courts, with the defendant having a right of judicial review. 53
Although the FTC can also negotiate settlements with any form of relief, the
agency's administrative power is limited to injunctive relief through issuing
an administrative order. 54 If the agency wants to compel public compensation or impose civil fines, it must petition a court. 55 The CFPB can seek all
three types of relief, whether through an administrative process or through
the courts. 56
III.

SCHOLARSHIP BACKGROUND

How the government enforces its laws is a critical question for any
democracy. Legal scholars have long wrestled with theories of enforcement:
goals, optimal levels, legitimizing principles, and mechanisms to control
politicization. The wider literature often focuses on criminal enforcement, 57
but we focus on civil enforcement theory and its specific application to discussions of public enforcement.
A.

Normative Discussion of Public Enforcement

Although the research in this area is limited, a few normative debates
have emerged about the role and boundaries of public enforcement. In the
past few years, there has been an increased focus on the office of the state
attorney general, the most important public enforcer of consumer protection
law at the state level. 58 The office itself has attracted both its defenders and
its critics. Margaret Lemos and Max Minzner have questioned the efficiency
52

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.208 (West 2016).
See, e.g., Mo. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW § 13-403(b)(l)(i) (West 2016).
54
See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012) (power to issue cease and desist orders). The only appellate court to consider whether the FTC has administrative power to order public compensation
rejected the idea. See Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323-24 (9th Cir. 1979).
55
See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2012) (empowering judiciary to grant "such relief as the court
finds necessary"). The court's power to levy a civil fine against non-rule violations of Section
5 is restricted to violations that occur "with actual knowledge that such act or practice is unfair
or deceptive and is unlawful." Id. § 45(m)(l)(B)(2).
56
See 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2) (2012).
57
See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF
LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 1-15 (1968).
58
See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For Profit Public Enforcement, 127
HARV. L. REV. 853, 854 (2014); see also Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation,
104 GEO. L.J. 515, 548-49 (2016) [hereinafter Lemos, Privatizing]. But see Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 15, at 512; Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 16, at 722. For
supportive examinations, see generally Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive Practice
Enforcement in Financial Institution Regulation, 30 PACE L. REv. 279 (2009) [hereinafter,
Cox, Deceptive Practice Enforcement]; Hensler, supra note 8; Totten, Credit Reform, supra
note 22.
53
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of public enforcement actions through the state attorneys general due to perceived conflicts stemming from enforcer motivations and consequent remedial structures. 59 With respect to the perceived remedial functions of public
enforcement of aggregate claims, there are calls for an expansion to the public realm of the many procedural reforms previously applied to the private
class action. 60 Other scholars resist these reforms (1) because such reforms
do not connect to the actual remedial functions of public enforcement6 1 and
(2) due to the structural need to maintain a robust role for public enforcers to
obtain public compensation on behalf of harmed individuals in light of limited access to the private class action. 62
Scholarly focus on distribution of enforcement powers goes beyond assessing the enforcement by state attorneys general. Recently, scholars have
turned toward institutional arguments examining distribution of enforcement
power within the larger public realm itself. This tum continues to assess
normatively the efficiency of each enforcement model, and it also brings in
more contextual and institutional theories focused on accountability and independence within the federalist system.
For example, scholars have examined the exercise of concurrent enforcement authority between state and federal enforcers, pointing out the
accountability-forcing mechanisms such concurrent enforcement schemes
might encourage, as well as other benefits like additional resources and the
specific knowledge states can bring to enforcement decisions. 63 Concurrent
enforcement of federal law is part of a series of legislative design choices to
situate an agency within our federalist system. Rachel Barkow proposes
"equalizing" factors that affect an agency's propensity for capture, which in
tum can determine levels of enforcement. 64 One of these equalizing factors is
the agency's enforcement interaction with other agencies, both federal and
state. 65 Barkow writes that "[a] multiple enforcer model with an insulated

59
See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 58, at 854; see also Lemos, Aggregate Litigation,
supra note 15, at 512-18; Lemos, Privatizing, supra note 58, at 548-49.
60
See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 16; see also Adam Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 500, 555-56 (2011).
61
See Cox, supra note 50.
62
See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC' s
Fair Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 331-34 (2015).
63
See Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 16; Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of
National Policy: A Contextualist Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97
MINN. L. REv. 1343, 1356-59 (2013) [hereinafter Rose, State Enforcement]; Amanda M.
Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 2173, 2204-05 (2010) [hereinafter Rose, Multienforcer]; Totten, supra note 22, at
122-25; Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a
Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and
Improvement Act of2008, 29 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 165, 171-72 (2010); Amy Widman &
Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General's Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in
Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 64 (2011).
64
Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture through Institutional Design,
89 Tux. L. REv. 15, 18 (2010).
65
See id. at 55-58.
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agency and state AGs is likely to be more effective than a multiple enforcer
model involving only federal agencies because the federal agencies are all
likely to ultimately fall in line with the President's priorities, and those priorities will frequently be dictated by powerful political interest groups." 66
Critics of concurrent enforcement schemes claim that such schemes create
unpredictability and disunity, as well as creating the possibility for policy
distortion and less accountability within particular jurisdictions. 67
Beyond the vertical distribution of enforcement powers in our federalist
system, scholars have also considered the horizontal distribution of enforcement authority. These scholars examine the effects of multiagency and multistate enforcement. 68 Relying on institutional theory to assess understudied
issues of shared regulatory authority among multiple federal agencies, Catherine Sharkey focuses on the multiagency design of federal consumer protection regulation and the problems that arise when courts must consider
deference to agencies that share interpretive authority. 69 Sharkey promotes
greater deference by courts when overlapping agencies coordinate regulatory
enforcement. 70 Max Minzner also examines the effects of decentralized enforcement among multiple specialized agencies and suggests that regulatory
expertise does not necessarily translate to enforcement expertise. 71 Minzner
proposes that legislatures pay more attention to agency design choice on
enforcement and argues that centralized civil enforcement in one generalist
agency might be an optimal design for many specialist agencies. 72
In the wake of the economic crisis, scholars more directly addressed
UDAP enforcement in consumer financial protection. 73 Prentiss Cox explains
the critical role of UDAP enforcement in heading off economic crises, and
seeks to promote more robust enforcement of UDAP as a first line of defense. 74 Describing the legal and historical events leading up to the economic
crisis, Mark Totten expands on assessments of enforcement quality and argues in support of decentralized approaches to consumer protection enforcement. 75 Raymond Brescia engages in a micro-study of UDAP' s applicability
to the robo-sign scandal as a component of the larger crisis. 76 Dee Pridgen
66

Id. at 58.
See Rose, State Enforcement, supra note 63, at 1351-54.
68
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 64; Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN.
L. REv. 2113, 2118-20 (2015); Rose, Multienforcer, supra note 63; Catherine M. Sharkey,
Agency Coordination in Consumer Protection, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 329, 329-31 (2013).
69
See Sharkey, supra note 68, at 353-56 (promoting the benefits of a judicial review
coordination strategy that encourages agencies with overlapping authority to coordinate
responses).
70
See id.
71
See Minzner, supra note 68, at 2121-35.
72
See id.
73
See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of the
Robo-Sign Scandal, 64 ME. L. REv. 17, 18 (2011); Cox, Deceptive Practice Enforcement,
supra note 58, at 279; Totten, supra note 1, at 1611.
74
See Cox, Deceptive Practice Enforcement, supra note 58, at 279.
75
See Totten, supra note 1, at 1611.
76
See Brescia, supra note 73, at 18.
67
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evaluates the gaps in federal UDAP enforcement and explains how the
CFPB's structure and UDAP enforcement authority is designed to fill in
those gaps. 77
B.

Descriptive Discussions of Public Enforcement

The dominant literature debating enforcement uses an economic approach focused primarily on efficiency, and thus seeks to answer normative
questions about the optimal quantity of enforcement. 78 Recently, however,
the almost universal economic view of enforcement as driven primarily by a
question of optimal quantity may be giving way to new questions addressing
quality and texture of enforcement. 79 Scholars' empirical analysis of enforcement, institutional understandings of enforcement, and legitimizing theories
for public enforcement80 are all examples of scholars beginning to think
about enforcement quality and relationships, rather than merely quantity. Beyond asking questions tied to efficiency, these scholars are thinking about
enforcement behaviorally, and within a pragmatic context. 81 What does enforcement look like and how are the actors in a decentralized enforcement
scheme interacting? For example, David Engstrom maps the different "pathways" that private enforcement can take and, in so doing, captures more
distinctions of private enforcement. 82
These empirically-based studies have examined enforcement with an
eye toward capturing a more descriptive, and thus more contextual, assessment. Contextual empirical work shifts the debate about enforcement from
an abstract one-size-fits-all discussion to a nuanced understanding of how
enforcement looks in particular situations. Ideally, these descriptions can
ground normative theories in an understanding of current practice.

77
See Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and
Stronger Laws, 13 Wvo. L. REv. 405, 407 (2013).
78
See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL.
EcoN. 169, 170 (1968).
79
See Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New
World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 61 (2009).
80
See Margaret H. Lemos, Democratic Enforcement? Accountability and Independence
for the Litigation State, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 929, 929-30 (2017); Velikonja, supra note 62,
at 331.
81
See Nourse & Shaffer, supra note 79, at 107; see also David Engstrom, Harnessing the
Private Attorney General: Evidence for Qui Tam Litigation, 112 Cot.UM. L. REV. 1244, 1256
(2012) (using empirical analysis of a particular private-public enforcement scheme to show
that "an alternative to the above approaches to rationalizing private enforcement regimes focuses less on litigation quantity and more on its quality by shaping the identities and capacities
of the private enforcers themselves").
82
See Engstrom, supra note 81, at 1325 ("[C]laims about the virtues and vices of private
enforcement--claims that echo across a range of regulatory regimes that deploy private litigation as a policy tool--cannot be understood solely by reference to the actions of decentralized,
profit-motivated litigants. Rather, the challenges of deploying private enforcement as a regulatory tool begin well upstream and are endemic to delegation itself.").
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Before turning to the scholarship on public UDAP enforcement, we
pause to examine recent studies of securities enforcement that ask these sorts
of contextual questions. James Park's examination of the decentralized landscape of SEC enforcement is indicative of the critical turn toward a richly
descriptive assessment.s 3 Park argues that existing normative analysis in the
securities realm skews the discussion toward net efficiency without allowing
for variations among enforcers in a multi-enforcer, decentralized landscape. 84 In other words, Park argues, when assessing enforcement outcomes,
the quality of enforcement is more important than the quantity.ss Therefore,
Park argues, the economic-based enforcement scholarship has left a gap by
focusing on efficiency only.s6 Moreover, Park points out that securities law
(like consumer protection law) is not only decentralized by the enforcer, but
is also an amalgam of rules and principles. s7 When a system has multiple
enforcers and multiple schemes (along the rules versus principles spectrum),
Park argues that any assessment of enforcement must include assessing the
quality of enforcement and that requires understanding the substantive differences between legislative delegations.ss Park concludes by stating,
It is with principle-enforcement that we see the greatest variation
in enforcement. The need for predictability and consistency can
conflict with a desire to punish conduct that runs afoul of public
value .... The key to defining an optimal system lies in understanding the dynamics of principle-enforcement and recognizing
the benefits of multiple enforcers, while crafting a system that better defines the boundaries within which securities enforcers
operate.s9
Amanda Rose and Urska Velikonja echo this textural approach to understanding enforcement in the securities arena. 90 The empirical scholarship on

83

See Park, supra note 38, at 115-16.
See id. at 118 ("The tendency in the literature surrounding this debate, which relies
heavily on economic theories of enforcement, has been to focus on whether the right amount
of enforcement is produced, without drawing distinctions between types of enforcement cases.
The limit of this approach is the absence of a meaningful way of determining what level of
enforcement is optimal.").
85
See id.
86
See id.; see also Dana Muir, Decentralized Enforcement to Combat Financial Wrongdoing in Pensions: What Types of Watchdogs are Necessary to Keep the Foxes out of the
Henhouse, 53 AM. Bus. L.J. 33, 37 (2016) (applying Park's "values-based" analysis to pension
law enforcement).
87
See Park, supra note 38, at 115.
88
See id. at 143 ("Finally, some enforcers may go through the motions of enforcing principles but in a way that treats principle violations as akin to rule violations that only merit
nominal sanctions. While technically enforcing the principle, without significant sanctions, the
action can be dismissed as a relatively trivial administrative cost. Even though such an enforcer is technically enforcing a principle, it cannot be considered a true enforcer of
principles.").
89
Id. at 181.
90
See Rose, State Enforcement, supra note 63, at 1344; Velikonja, supra note 80, at 331.
84
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public enforcement of consumer protection law in general, or UDAP laws in
particular, is even more limited. 91 The main areas of empirical scholarship
are focused on state attorney general participation in multistate lawsuits, 92
state enforcement of federal consumer protection law, 93 and agency-specific
studies of enforcement. 94
In a series of empirically-based articles, Colin Provost examines the
role of multistate litigation as an enforcement choice among state attorneys
general. 95 His data reveal a multistate enforcement model that is responsive
to the electorate and effective in cases of severe infractions.% Paul Nolette is
more critical of these types of coordinated litigation actions by state attorneys general. 97 Nolette relies on a dataset of all "coordinated AG litigation"
that took place between 1980 and 2013. 98 Nolette concludes that coordinated
litigation has grown over time, in both quantity and quality, and he warns
that this type of activity can go beyond influencing a lax federal enforcement
system and instead can "dictate the terms of national policy ."99 This, Nolette
argues, upsets the federalism balance. 100 Amy Widman and Prentiss Cox empirically examine claims about concurrent enforcement strategies, specifically how states enforce federal consumer protection law. 101 Their findings
"strongly suggest that fears about over-enforcement or inconsistent enforcement by the states have not been realized in actual practice." 102
Descriptive studies of agency enforcement are by nature contextual and
this type of work provides important contributions to greater understanding
of the quality of enforcement of consumer protection. 103 Christopher Peter91
This section focuses on empirical studies of public enforcement, but we note recent
empirical work examining private enforcement of consumer protection law as well. See, e.g.,
JOSHUA D. WRIGHT ET AL., SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST.: STATE CONSUMER PROT. ACTS TASK
fuRCE, STA·m CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS: AN EMPIRICAL lNVESTIGATION OF PRIVATE LITIGATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT, DECEMBER 2009 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1708175
[https://perma.cc/7Y2X-MTH3]; Stephen Meili, Collective Justice of Personal Gain? An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Class Action Lawyers and Named Plaintiffs, 44 AKRON L. REV.
67 (2011) (analyzing qualitative data on the motivations of named plaintiffs and class action
lawyers in consumer class actions).
92
See, e.g., NOLE"ITE, supra note 5; Colin L. Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State
AG Behavior in Multi-State Litigation, 10 ST. PoL. & Prn.'Y Q. I (2010); Provost, Entrepreneurship, supra note 5; Provost, Politics, supra note 5.
93
See, e.g., Widman & Cox, supra note 63.
94
See, e.g., Maureen K. Olhausen, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Effective Tool for
Developing the Law or Rubber Stamp?, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 623, 625-28 (2016);
Peterson, supra note 29.
95
See Provost, Politics, supra note 5; Provost, Entrepreneurship, supra note 5.
96
See Provost, Politics, supra note 5; Provost, Entrepreneurship, supra note 5.
97
See NoLEITE, supra note 5.
98
See id. at 21 (using data including antitrust, consumer protection, health care, and environmental litigation, broadly defined).
99
Id. at 2.
100

See generally id.
See Widman & Cox, supra note 63, at 53-55.
Id. at 55.
103
See, e.g., Olhausen, supra note 94, at 625-28 (conducting a review of administrative
wi
102

actions brought by the FTC to determine whether criticisms of being a "kangaroo court" are
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son recently examined all CFPB enforcement actions between 2011 and
2015. 104 Peterson's study included all publicly announced enforcement actions (as opposed to focusing on the enforcement of the general UDAAP
prohibition only). 105 Overall, Peterson's data reveal an investigative, collaborative, and efficient agency. 106 Moreover, within the time period he studied,
all of the enforcement actions were uncontested and the controversial "abusive" standard was cautiously enforced. 107 Peterson's findings fill an important gap in understanding the quality of enforcement at this new agency, and
many of his findings are contrary to claims made by those critical of the
agency.1os
Beyond these studies, however, the landscape is barren. Reviewing recent research in the area of consumer protection law, Stephen Meili lamented the lack of empirical work and concluded that "[t]his imbalance is
both surprising and troubling, given that it is in the interests of all consumers, and society generally, for cash-strapped regulators to enforce the law as
effectively and efficiently as possible." 109 Other scholars have openly called
for empirical investigation of public enforcement of consumer protection
law, especially given the important normative debates that lack empirical
background. 110 This project aims to fill that void.
IV.

METHODOLOGY

This Part explains the study design, including the scope of the cases
studied, the methods of collecting case documents and data, the identity of
the public enforcers, and the limitations imposed by the methodology.
A.

Scope of Cases Studied

We collected and analyzed cases by a federal or state public enforcement entity ("enforcer") alleging violations of a principle-based UDAP statupheld by the data and finding that the criticisms are not supported); Peterson, supra note 29,
at l 063--64.
104
See Peterson, supra note 29, at 1106-12.
105
See id.
106
See id.
107
See id.
108
See id. at 1104 ("The data reported in this Article should serve as an analytical benchmark against which future Bureau action can be measured and as a needle to deflate the absurdly overheated political rhetoric used to grandstand against the CFPB's mission and
accomplishments. Vapid allegations that the new consumer protection agency is a 'Frankenstein monster,' based on 'the Stalin model,' or taking the first steps toward 'socialism' are
thoughtlessly untethered from reality." (internal citations omitted)).
109 See Stephen Meili, Consumer Protection, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL
LEGAL RESEARCH 176, 187 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010).
0
"
Deborah Hensler criticized Margaret Lemos's article, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public, saying her analysis is "heavy on theory and light on empirics-indeed, her article does not
contain any empirical data about the nature and frequency of the litigation that concerns her."
See Hensler, supra note 8, at 58.
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ute resolved during the calendar year 2014. Cases were deemed to have been
resolved in 2014 based on the date the final order was filed with the court or
administrative agency, or on the latest date of execution by any party to a
settlement agreement. 111 This subpart describes cases determined within the
scope of the study with respect to two concerns: (1) which cases alleged
principle-based UDAP violations; and (2) which cases were resolved in
2014, including cases with multiple resolving documents.
1.

Public Enforcers and Principle-Based UDAP Statutes

We limited our study to enforcement of principles enunciated in UDAP
laws rather than rule-based consumer protection. As discussed above, principle-based enforcement occurs where the legislature has provided a broad
standard, and that standard is not tied to particular policy goals but rather
broad norms, like fairness. This type of delegation, by its nature, is a conscious choice of the legislature to rely substantially on the enforcer's discretion. Our aim is to provide a snapshot of how UDAP enforcers use their
discretion and to provide a typology of enforcement strategies.
All UDAP cases resolved by federal enforcers expressly identified that
the enforcer was claiming a violation of either the unfair, deceptive, or abusive principles in the UDAP law. Therefore, every case by the FfC or CFPB
alleging a UDAP violation was within the scope of the study because it included a principle-based UDAP claim.
UDAP claims by state enforcers were not always as clearly delineated
as the principle-based claims. In two types of cases, state enforcement nominally pursued under a UDAP statute constitutes a rule-based action. First,
some rule-based state consumer protection laws identify a violation of that
Jaw as a per se violation of the state UDAP as a means to provide enforcement remedies. For example, a failure to license or register a business can be
a per se violation of a state UDAP law. 112 Second, some UDAP statutes go
beyond an elaboration of UDAP principles and include rule-based provisions. For example, the Oregon UDAP statute contains extensive rule provisions, such as prohibiting the sale of "a motor vehicle manufactured after
January 1, 2006, that contains mercury light switches." 113 Most cases that
presented rule-based applications of a UDAP statute were patent, but a few
required judgment calls. In these instances, all three researchers evaluated
the case documents and reached consensus on whether to include the case.

111
For cases brought as a joint action by two or more enforcers, which we refer to as
multi-enforcer cases, we modified the last date rule to be the year in which a majority of the
participating states filed or executed the common settlement.
112
See, e.g., ARK. CoDE ANN.§ 4-28-416 (West 2017) (failure to register as a charity is a
per se violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
113
See OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 646.608(l)(z) (West 2016).
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Resolved Cases

We measured resolution at the trial or administrative level without regard to appeal, although we tracked the outcomes of appeals in contested
cases. When cases with more than one defendant resulted in more than one
resolving document, we treated each resolving document as a separate case
only if the resolving document met one of the following criteria: (1) it was a
judicial proceeding with a final judgment under Rule 54(b ); (2) it was an
administrative proceeding that produced an order using the same principles
as Rule 54(b); or (3) it was an assurance of voluntary compliance, which is a
unique form of pre-complaint settlement available to state attorneys general
by statute in most states. 114 Otherwise, we determined that a case with multiple resolving documents was in scope if the last order or settlement resolving all issues of liability and remedies occurred during 2014.
B.

Data Collection and Coding

For each case within the study scope, we attempted to collect a resolving document, such as a final order or final settlement. When available, we
also collected an initiating document, such as a judicial or administrative
complaint. We obtained these documents through online searches of enforcer
websites and electronic case data repositories, government open record requests, and direct requests to specific government officials. The FTC and the
CFPB post all resolved enforcement actions on their websites. 115
State enforcers do not routinely post on their websites copies of documents from resolved UDAP enforcement actions, although at least seven
states make all or most of their UDAP enforcement actions available for
download. 116 We sent requests under state open records laws to all state attorneys general, including the District of Columbia, and five state consumer
agencies. 117 We obtained a 100% response rate with these requests. 118 Finally,
114

See supra part Il.B.; see also Cox, supra note 50, at 2355 n.213 (2016).
See Cases & Proceedings, U.S. FED. TRADE CoMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings [https://perma.cc/F6MJ-KHFW] (providing a database with "[a]ll
FTC cases & proceedings" and noting that more recent cases "can be filtered by name and
date."); Enforcement Actions, U.S. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://
www .consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions [https://perma.cc/S5WY XQAK] ("When we take an enforcement action against an entity or person we believe has
violated the law, we will post court documents and other related materials here."). The CFPB
also confirmed its 2014 cases through an informal information request. Email from Delicia
Hand, Staff Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Prentiss Cox, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of
Minn. Sch. of Law (July 23, 2015, 3:19 PM) (on file with author) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
116
Colorado, Kansas, Maryland and Wyoming post resolving documents online for most
of their 2014 UDAP cases. Idaho, New Jersey and Vermont made all of their 2014 UDAP
enforcement actions available online.
117
The state open records law requests sought the following documents: "(a) any action
by [name of the enforcer] to enforce a violation or alleged violation of [name of state UDAP
law], or any similar UDAP law of [name of state] that authorizes your office to bring actions
115
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we sent informal requests to specific government officials for ancillary data
related to specific cases, such as missing exhibits from orders, and to identity state leadership in multistate cases.
Figure 1 breaks down these cases by the type of enforcer alleging
UDAP violations. We identified a total of 798 cases within the scope of the
study. State enforcers brought a total of 671 cases when only one state was
the enforcer, which we label as "individual state" cases. 119 The FTC brought
ninety-four in-scope cases and the CFPB brought ten cases, for a total of 104
cases identified as "individual federal" cases in Figure 1. Finally, twentythree cases were "multi-enforcer" actions, meaning they were cases brought
as a joint action by two or more enforcers from different jurisdictions, with
the noted various combinations of federal and state enforcers.

104

FEDERAL

FIG. 1.

NUMBER OF CASES BY ENFORCER TYPE [NOT TO SCALE]

For each case, we coded 147 fields of data about the allegations made
in the case and the relief obtained. All of this data derived from the face of
under statutes commonly known as consumer fraud or UDAP (unfair or deceptive acts and
practices) laws, but not actions under these laws limited solely to antitrust or unfair competition claims; (b) for which a Final Order or other similar document was issued, or an Assurance, Consent Judgment or other form of final settlement was issued or obtained; and (c) that
Final Order, Consent Judgment, Assurance or other similar document was obtained or issued
during calendar year 2014 (January 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014)."
118
The following states were particularly noteworthy for timely and clear communication
and production regarding our requests for a large number of documents: Connecticut, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oregon. Although some states made
it difficult to obtain requested records, the authors mostly encountered cooperation with their
often onerous requests for production of state records, and they are grateful for the diligence
and professionalism of the staff attorneys handling these requests.
119
In ten individual state cases a state agency other than an attorney general or administrative agency joined the state UDAP enforcer in the action, including eight cases brought jointly
by the Colorado Attorney General and the Colorado Uniform Credit Code Administrator.
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the resolving document and, when available, the initiating document. All
three researchers coded cases. Multiple test coding occurred to ensure the
reliability of the process. After reducing variability among researchers, we
evenly divided the cases for coding. To ensure uniformity of coding and
prevent drift of coding over time, two researchers periodically blind-coded
cases and compared results. We resolved discrepancies and discussed differences. These coding checks occurred with greater frequency at the beginning
of the coding process, but continued until the end. On key coding variables
reported here, including form of resolution, type of relief, and dollar
amounts of relief, variance was minimal.
The cases included 1802 defendants in the 798 cases studied, or an
average of 2.25 defendants per case. Entity defendants were more common
than individual defendants, with actions against 1045 entities and 757 individuals. In addition to deriving information about defendants from the face
of the collected documents, we searched databases for additional data about
entity defendants. The Mergent Intellect database current in 2016 provided
information for 653, or 62.5% of all entity defendants. For 311 entities, or
29.8% of the entity defendants, we identified defendant data from the Lexis
"Company Profiles" multi-source database, including information from Experian through Lexis, and by searching state government websites containing corporation information for the state in which the entity was
incorporated. We were unable to identify any external data on 81 entities, or
7.8% of all entity defendants.
These external databases provided six fields of data about each entity . 120
We used two of the fields-number of employees and annual revenue-to
categorize the defendants by size in Parts V and VI. Of the 1045 entity
defendants, we identified database information for one or both of these fields
for 766 of these entities, or 73.3% of the defendants. For the 279 defendants
with no size data, we determined that 100 of these entities, or 9.7% of all
defendant entities, had their corporate status either revoked or dissolved in
their state of incorporation.
C.

Public UDAP Enforcers

Two concerns arose in compiling the data by enforcer. First, five states
authorize an administrative agency to enforce their UDAP laws in addition
to or instead of the state attorney general. 121 In three of those states-Georgia, Hawaii, and Utah-the state attorney general did not bring any UDAP
cases. Therefore, our reference to enforcers in these states is to the administrative agency. In Connecticut, the agency has sole discretion to bring a

120
The following data was collected from external databases on each entity defendant,
when available: public or private company, subsidiary status, minority owned, NAICS code,
number of employees at all sites, and annual revenue.
121
See supra note 33.
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UDAP case, although the state attorney general litigates the case. In Wisconsin, the Attorney General has independent authority to bring a UDAP case,
but brought cases during 2014 only as an attorney for the administrative
agency. For purposes of this study, we treat the agency and the state attorney
general as one enforcer in these two states. 122 Because we considered the
District of Columbia to be a state and treated states with an administrative
agency as having only one enforcer, the data on states are reported for fiftyone enforcers.
Second, we divided cases in which multiple enforcers joined into small
multi-enforcer actions and large multi-enforcer actions. Small multi-enforcer
actions include either one federal and one state enforcer, or a group of up to
twenty state enforcers, with or without a federal enforcer. These cases divide
into the following two groups: 123
1.

Joint Federal-State. In ten cases, a federal enforcer, typically the
FTC, paired with up to three states. The FTC joined only with Connecticut in three actions and only with Florida in three actions. The
FTC joined with two states in two cases: once with Illinois and
New York, and once with Illinois and Ohio. The FTC paired with
three states-Illinois, North Carolina and Kentucky-in one case.
The CFPB joined with two states, North Carolina and Virginia, in
one case. In addition to these ten cases, the CFPB joined with thirteen states to pursue Colfax Capital Corporation and related entities
in a bankruptcy proceeding following enforcement actions by the
states.
2. Multi-state Only. In five cases, no federal enforcer participated.
Only two states joined in two cases, but the remaining three cases
involved a larger number of states (six, nine, and twenty,
respectively).
Large multi-enforcer actions involved forty-two or more states joining
in an action, often with a federal enforcer. These cases divide into the following three categories:
1.

122

NMS. Two cases were part of the National Mortgage Settlement
(NMS) cases. 124 The CFPB and fifty states joined in these two cases
against large mortgage servicing entities resolved in 2014. 125

See supra note 25.
The one case outside this categorization was an unusual action in which the CFPB and
thirteen states joined to protect their common interests against a group of defendants in a
bankruptcy proceeding. See Settlement Agreement between Paul J. Mansdorf, Trustee of the
Estate of Colfax Capital Corp., the CFPB & Thirteen States, In Re Colfax Capital Corp., No.
08-45902 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 10, 2014).
124
See supra note 4.
125
Only Oklahoma did not participate in this settlement. The U.S. Department of Justice
joined one of these settlements.
123
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Telecom Cases. Two cases were against telecommunications companies for unauthorized charges on cell phone bills. All fifty-one
states joined the FfC and the FCC in these cases.
Multi-State Only. In three cases, groups of forty-two to forty-six
states joined without a federal enforcer. Two of these cases were
against pharmaceutical companies; the other case was against a satellite radio company.
D.

Study Limitations

As with any empirical study, our methodology results in limitations imposed by the design of the study. One limitation is that we collected data
only on cases resolved in one calendar year, 2014, even though many of
those cases were initiated in years prior to 2014. We obtained a substantial
number of cases for one year of enforcement, but it may result in problems
from "small n" assessments when the data is applied at the level of individual enforcers with a smaller number of cases. For example, if a state attorney
general had two UDAP cases in 2014, it may be that the same enforcer had
no cases or five cases the previous or following year. The study also has
jurisdictional limits. We examined federal and state actions, but not local
public enforcement of UDAP law. California, in particular, has active enforcement of UDAP laws by local government entities. 126
Moreover, our study looks only at principle-based UDAP enforcement,
not all consumer protection public enforcement. Enforcers with UDAP authority could use non-UDAP consumer protection laws differently, quantitatively or qualitatively. However, we included in the database all cases with a
single UDAP claim, even if non-UDAP claims predominated. 127 In 55.3% of
cases enforcers asserted both types of claims, although this percentage varied by enforcer. 128 In addition, we identified state cases through a combination of means, but relied heavily on government open record requests for
these cases, and thus the study's state case repository depended substantially
on the accuracy of the open records responses.
Similarly, the data on entity defendants from external databases is limited in two ways. First, this data reflects the accuracy and reach of the external databases. Second, we collected this data during 2016 about cases
resolved in 2014. One possible result is that an enforcement action might
have substantially reduced the size of a company from 2014 to 2016.

126
Kathleen C. Engel, local Governments and Risky Home loans, 69 SMU L. REV. 609,
620 (2016).
127
We adjudged non-UDAP claims as primary in 53 of the 671 state cases, or 7.9%.
128
See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1. Entity defendant size data by enforcer
Entities (#)

Entities
with
known
size (#)

Entities
dissolved
or
unknown
size (%)

789
184
13
51
8

596
122
13
27
8

24.5
33.7
0.0
47.1
0.0

States
FTC
CFPB
Multi-small
Multi-large

Median
Mean
Mean
Median
entity def. entity def. entity def. entity def.
annual rev. annual rev. employees employees
(millions
(millions
(#)
(#)
of$)
of$)
2,053
3,029
696
286
6,854

0.46
2
152
1
2,961

6,670
2,253
23,468
266
13,744

5
15
3,165
5
7,888

State enforcers routinely brought cases against small entity defendants,
but the high mean suggests a number of cases against very large defendants.
To better measure the range of defendant types and size in state cases, we
excluded defendants with no known size data and then grouped state case
defendants by the largest defendant in the action. We then determined quartiles and the 90% level for the median number of employees and median
annual revenue of state entity defendants, and used these breakpoints to determine five categories for state case entity defendant size, as identified in
Table 2.
TABLE 2. Explanation of defendant size measures for state enforcers
Annual revenue ($)

Employees (#)
Tiny entity
Small entity
Medium entity
Large entity
Mega entity

<3
3-5
6-44
45-400
> 400

and
or
or
or
or

< 151,000
151,000 - 592,000
592,001 - 7,557,500
7,557,500 - 166,380,000
> 166,380,000

For each case, we isolated the defendant in the case that was in the
largest size category. 130 Table 3 shows the resulting distribution of state
cases:

130
When a defendant fell into different quartiles for employee numbers and for annual
revenue, we used the higher measure to determine the largest defendant in the case.
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TABLE 3. Frequency of state enforcer cases by largest size entity
defendant in each case
Cases when entity size known
Cases (#)
127
87
92
125

No entity defendant
Dissolved entity I no data
Tiny entity
Small entity
Medium entity
117
Large entity
76
Mega entity
47
Total
671
* May not add up to 100.0 due to rounding

Cases(%)
18.9
13.0

(%)

13.7

20.l

n/a
n/a

18.6

27.4

17.4
11.3

25.6
16.6
10.3
100.0

7.0
100.0*

That state enforcers pursue smaller targets should not surprise, but the
exceedingly small size of many such defendants is noteworthy. Over half of
state enforcer UDAP cases, 51.2%, are either against individuals only or had
a largest defendant entity with less than $592,000 in annual revenue or no
more than 6 employees. That percentage rises to 64.2% when including entities now dissolved or for which no data was available. For comparison, a
single-location children's bookstore near the home of one of the researchers
easily exceeds both these annual revenue and employee size measures.
Finally, we looked at the location of defendants in state cases to determine how often state enforcers brought cases against in-state defendants. We
were able to locate data on defendant location for 747 entities, or 94.7% of
entity defendants, and 446 individuals, or 69.5% of individual defendants. 131
When the defendant's location was known, 66.1 % of entity defendants and
59.7% of individual defendants resided in the same state as the enforcer.

B.

Prosecution and Resolution of Cases

Like most civil litigation, public UDAP enforcement actions mostly settle.132 Unlike most civil litigation, the prevailing party is rarely in doubt.
131
Principal place of business (PPB) was used to identify location for entities, when that
information was known; if unknown, we used state of incorporation. Of the 747 entities with
known location, 673 (90.1 %) were determined by entity PPB.
132
See LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTJCE, OFFICE OF JusTICE
PROGRAMS, CrvrL BENCH AND JURY ThIALS TN STATE CouRTS, 2005, at 1 (2008), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SYG-J5UM] ("Among jurisdictions that provided totals for both trial and non-trial general civil dispositions in 2005, trials
collectively accounted for about 3% of all tort, contract, and real property dispositions in
general jurisdiction courts."). However, empirical studies distinguishing non-tried cases that
settle from those decided by dispositive motion are slender. A study of Hawaii state court
cases in 1996 and 2007 found relatively low settlement rates, reporting that in 2007 settlement
occurred in 70% of all cases, with tort cases settling more frequently (88%) and foreclosure
cases least frequently (47%). See John Barkai & Elizabeth Kent, Let's Stop Spreading Rumors
About Settlement and Litigation: A Comparative Study of Settlement and Litigation in Hawaii
Courts, 29 OHIO ST. J. D1sP. RESOL. 85, 109 (2014) (also observing that these findings are
consistent with the few other studies examining settlement rates).
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Defendants prevailed in only one contested case. This subpart presents data
from our study on the form of case resolution, the duration of litigation and
the use of outside counsel by state enforcers.
All of the CFPB and multi-enforcer actions completed in 2014 were
settlements. The FTC and the state enforcers completed an almost identical
percentage of cases through contested resolution. The FTC resolved four
cases through judicial contest-two by trial and two by dispositive motionwhich represented 4.3% of all FTC cases. Similarly, state enforcers resolved
twenty-eight cases, or 3.7% of all cases, through a contested process. Almost
two-thirds of these contested cases were resolved by dispositive motion. Six
cases were decided by judicial trials and four by administrative hearing. 133
Of the thirty-two FTC and state cases decided by a contested decision, defendants prevailed in one state court bench trial. 134 In all other cases, the
UDAP enforcer prevailed. No defendant successfully appealed in any of
these contested cases. 135
Overall, state enforcers resolved 104 cases by default, or 15.5% of the
total number of cases. But eleven state enforcers, each of which is described
in Part VI as employing a particular type of enforcement strategy, accounted
for eighty-two, or 78.9%, of these default cases. The rate of default cases for
the other forty-one state enforcers was 6.6%. The FTC default rate, six cases
(6.4%), was almost identical to the rate for these state enforcers. These latter
default rates are almost identical to estimated default rates in general civil
litigation. 136
Enforcers often engaged in litigation prior to resolution, as measured by
the period between filing the initiating document and finalizing a settlement.
It is difficult to measure definitively the duration of litigation in public
UDAP enforcement because these enforcers have authority to obtain discovery prior to filing a complaint. 137 This pre-complaint discovery authority

133
All but one of the judicial trials were bench trials. The State of Wisconsin brought one
case that was decided, in part, by a jury trial resulting in a special verdict. See Judgment,
Wisconsin v. Going Places Travel Corp., Nos. 2010-CX-l-lD and lG-11 (Wis. Outgamie Cty.
Cir. Ct. July 7, 2014).
134
The one contested loss by an enforcer was a case brought by the Indiana Attorney
General. Indiana alleged a UDAP violation for a deceptive affiliation claim against an out of
state company soliciting by mail under the names "Local Records Office" and "National
Profile Document." See Indiana v. Juan Robert Romero Ascencio, No. 82C01-1305-PL-240
(Ind. Vanderburgh Cty. Cir. Ct. Oct. 13, 2014).
135
None of the four FfC cases were appealed. Of the twenty-eight state cases in which the
state enforcer prevailed, five cases were appealed, and the state prevailed as to liability in all
cases. People v. Wunder, 371 P.3d 785 (Colo. App. 2016) (affirming summary judgment for
state and remanding for further proceedings as to remedies); Law v. State, 163 So.3d 1196
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (appeal dismissed); State v. Dailey, 192 Wash. App. 1007 (Ct. App.
2016) (unpublished table decision) (lower court decision affirmed); State v. Going Places
Travel Corp., 864 N.W.2d 885 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (lower court judgment affirmed); State v.
Nelson Gamble & Assoc., No. 14AP-280 (Ohio Ct. App. July 17, 2014) (appeal dismissed).
136
See Barkai & Kent, supra note 132, at 111 (finding a 6% default rate in all cases in
study of Hawaii state court civil cases).
137
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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private actions in settlement documents, but the data revealed no case where
public and private enforcers joined as plaintiffs.
C.

Matters and Claims

In this subpart, we present data on the goods or services at issue in
public UDAP enforcement actions, the claims alleged by the enforcers (including both UDAP claims and, when joined to a UDAP claim, non-UDAP
claims), and the sales channels that defendants used. We gathered data on
the type of product at issue in a case in two ways-by categorizing the
products described in the documents and by collecting information on the
industry code of the entity defendants. We also gathered types of claims
brought by enforcers in two ways-by categorizing the UDAP violations
and by identifying the statute, rule, or other law violation alleged for nonUDAP claims joined to the UDAP claims. Finally, in many cases we identified a primary sales channel used by the defendants.
This data suggests that UDAP enforcers have a propensity for specializing in certain types of cases, at least in a given year. For the CFPB, this
specialization is mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. It brought cases only
against sellers of credit or banking products, and joined only non-UDAP
claims under federal consumer financial protection laws. 140 Unsurprisingly,
large multi-enforcer actions involved products in industries dominated by
large companies, with pharmaceuticals, mortgage origination and servicing,
and telecommunications accounting for six of the seven cases.
State enforcers and the FTC had distinct patterns as to products, industries, and claims. 141 Cases against motor vehicle dealers were frequent for
both types of enforcers, although to some extent they pursued different types
of claims against these defendants. 142 Table 4 shows the ten most common
categories of products at issue in cases brought by state enforcers and the
five most common categories of products in FTC cases. State enforcer top
categories are identified in blue; FTC top categories are identified in orange;
and common top categories are identified in red. The percentage represents
the share for that product compared to all product categories identified for
that type of enforcer. 143
140
The CFPB brought non-UDAP claims in six cases, including two cases with claims
under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2012), and two
cases with claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 168lx (2012).
141
Small multi-enforcer actions involved a diversity of products and claims that reflected
the approach of state enforcers and the FfC.
142
The FfC brought almost exclusively price deception claims against motor vehicle dealers (eleven of twelve UDAP claims), and the sales channel for the price deception was typically the internet (five of eight cases in which the sales channel was identifiable). The FTC
also used the Consumer Leasing Act (CLA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667, 1667f (2012), extensively
against motor vehicle dealers, accounting for all five cases by the FfC with CLA claims. State
claims varied.
143
Comparison of product codes aligned with the defendant entity codes. Frequencies of
industry codes by five-digit NAICS code reveals that the top industries represented by defend-
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TABLE 4. Products at issue in state enforcer and FTC cases

Construction/home repair
Motor vehicle sales/lease
Foreclosure rescue
Vacation/travel/lodging
Entertainment
Membership clubs
Debt settlement
Legal services
Debt collection
Gas/fuel/electricity
Medical or health services
Website/data services
Weight loss

State cases (#)

States% of
products

FTC cases (#)

FfC % of
products

104
85
36
24
18
17
17
16
16
15
11
5
3

14.8
12.1
5.1
3.4
2.6
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.1
1.6
0.7
0.4

0
11
1
0
3
0
0
0
5
0
13
12
9

0.0
10.7
1.0
0.0
2.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.9
0.0
12.6
11.7
8.7

The types of UDAP claims in state enforcer and FTC cases overlapped,
but also differed in key respects. Claims of deception about price and product benefits were frequent for both enforcers. The FTC' s greater use of product benefit deception claims was almost entirely attributable to its greater
pursuit of misrepresentations concerning health benefits or weight loss, with
41.2% of product benefit deception claims consisting of health or weight
loss claims for the FTC versus 7.5% for the state enforcers. The FTC also
brought a large number of claims for UDAP violations in data privacy/use
and a larger share of cases against website/data service providers, while the
states were mostly quiescent in this area. The state enforcers commonly
brought UDAP claims for the seller's failure to deliver a product and for
misrepresentations about the seller's identity, including the seller's licensure
status and qualifications. A disproportionate share of these claims were in
cases against the most frequent type of state defendant, home construction,
and repair contractors, with such cases accounting for 59 .1 % of "failure to
deliver" claims and 36.2% of "seller/product identity" claims for state
enforcers.

ants are legal services, consulting services, travel agencies, car dealers, consumer lending,
commercial banking, and construction.
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channels at issue in state cases, including telemarketing, 147 foreclosure, 148
and debt collection. 149
D.

Relief Characteristics

Public enforcers obtain three types of relief in UDAP actions: injunctive relief, government money, and public compensation. 150 We examine the
characteristics of this relief in four areas: an overview of the frequency,
amount, and distribution among cases of the three forms of relief; the type of
injunctive relief; the bases for recovering government money and the
amounts of relief; and the amount of public compensation and how distribution of this relief is structured.
The data on relief are restricted to cases that resolved through settlement or contested decisions; in other words, we did not count default cases
in the data on relief. This decision resulted in the exclusion of 110 of the 798
cases (104 state enforcer cases and 6 FTC cases), leaving a non-default case
total of 688 cases. Default cases are excluded because the relief does not
reflect the likely outcome if contested by the defendant, and presumably
money relief usually is uncollected.
When reporting on the amount of money we use three terms that need
explanation. First, net government money is government money exclusive of
dollar amounts identified as suspended in the resolving document, which
occurred with some frequency. 151 Second, dollar amounts for public compensation constitute known dollar amounts for this relief, exclusive of cases in
which the dollar amount of relief was not identifiable from the resolving
document. 152 Third, the term total dollar relief equals net government money
plus public compensation dollar amounts.
1.

Overview of Relief Obtained

A defining feature of public UDAP actions is that enforcers obtain injunctive relief. States resolved all but 4.2% of cases with this form of relief,

147
Consistent with long-term patterns, states and the FfC most heavily used the FfC
Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR), 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2016), with states bringing a TSR claim in
thirteen individual state enforcer cases and three multi-enforcer cases, and the FfC asserting
TSR violations in ten of the thirty-nine non-UDAP claims, see also Widman & Cox, supra
note 63, at 53 (noting that telemarketing laws are by far the most frequently used federal law
by state enforcers).
148
State claims for violation of the FfC rule on foreclosure assistance, 12 C.F.R. § 1015
(2016), were brought in ten individual state cases, and one multi-enforcer case, while the FfC
employed this rule in one case.
149
Although not expressly authorized to enforce the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1692, 1692p (2012), state enforcers nonetheless brought claims alleging a violation
of this law in ten individual state cases.
150
See supra notes 50--56 and accompanying text.
151
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
152
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 6. Percentage use of types of conduct restrictions by enforcer type

General prohibition of future
UDAP violations
Certain representations
prohibited
Certain disclosures required
Prohibited from specific
conduct at issue in Suit
Requirements for contract
consent
Ban on some form of
conducting business
Service/contact or refund
process requirements
Limits on gathering/selling
information
Required training of employees

State

CFPB

FfC

Multi-small

Multi-large

25.3

0.0

3.2

2.7

3.7

15.2

35.3

37.8

21.6

14.8

11.9
17.3

5.9
5.9

23.5
12.4

32.4
8.1

14.8
25.9

2.1

0.0

1.9

2.7

25.9

19.7

11.8

10.1

21.6

0.0

4.5

17.6

0.9

2.7

11.1

1.5

0.0

8.3

8.1

0.0

2.6

23.5

1.8

0.0

3.7

Yet enforcers clearly had preferences not driven by the subject matter
of the action. States, for example, favored generally stated prohibitions on
future violations of their UDAP laws. The CFPB, perhaps reflecting its role
as a supervisory agency as well as a UDAP enforcer, was much more likely
to obtain relief about consumer service requirements and training of employees. The FfC and small multi-enforcer injunctive relief pattern was similar,
with more use of limits on gathering and using consumer information, perhaps reflecting the FfC's greater interest in data privacy issues.
For two of these categories-a ban on some form of conducting business and contractual consent requirements-we also coded for more detailed
categorical descriptions. Large multi-enforcer cases focused on contractual
consent restrictions. One of our sub-categories for contractual consent was a
requirement that the defendant use a notice or form prescribed in the resolving document. This form appeared in only twelve cases across the 778 nondefault cases, or 1.5%, but this form of injunction was issued in three of the
seven large multi-enforcer cases.
Perhaps the most surprising result was the widespread use of a ban on
certain forms of business conduct. Large multi-enforcer cases did not use
this type of injunctive relief, but all other enforcer types obtained some form
of business ban in a substantial number of cases. The CFPB and the FfC
obtained a business ban in about 20% of cases, state enforcers obtained this
relief in 38% of cases, and half of small multi-enforcer cases included some
form of ban. Table 7 shows the breakdown of the various forms of this type
of injunction for the states, the FfC, and the small multi-enforcers. 155

155

The CFPB obtained a business ban in two cases.
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TABLE 7. Percentage use as of various forms of
conduct ban by enforcer type

Any conduct in jurisdiction
Conduct in defined sector
Certain types of sales conduct
Surrender license or no conduct w/out license
Other conduct
Total

States

FTC

Multi-Small

9.3
50.6
17.9
12.5
9.7
100.0

0.0
63.6
36.4
0.0
0.0
100.0

7.1
42.9
50.0
0.0
0.0
100.0

Finally, the enforcers also substantially differed in obtaining relief with
or without an express time limit. The FTC and the CFPB strongly favored
injunctive relief with an express duration. The FTC used a boilerplate
twenty-year limit on injunctive relief in most of its administrative orders,
accounting for 58.0% of all of FTC cases. Similarly, in 60.0% of the CFPB
cases (all administrative orders), the agency made injunctive relief effective
for a limited duration, with all but one of these cases establishing a five-year
limit. State enforcers obtained time-limited injunctive relief in 6.3% of
cases, with typical time limits of about five years. Small multi-enforcer cases
did not appear to have duration limits on injunctive relief, while large multienforcer injunctive relief was time-limited in two of seven cases.
3.

Government Money

Public UDAP enforcers have authority to seek civil penalties for violations, and also obtain government money as a remedy on other bases. We
divided receipt of money by enforcers other than for public compensation
into five categories: (1) civil penalty; (2) fees and costs of investigation or
litigation, including attorney's fees ("fees"); (3) cy pres awards; (4) money
for other designated purpose; and (5) money that is not designated as to its
basis, or that mentions multiple of the above purposes without differentiation
as to amount ("undesignated"). This subpart presents data on the allocation
of government money relief between these categories, the dollar amounts of
such relief by enforcer, the use of this money, and the suspension of defendants' obligations for government money relief.
For federal enforcers, government money relief is easy to describe. The
CFPB obtained a civil penalty in every case and directed that money in each
instance to the agency's Civil Penalty Fund. 156 The FTC rarely obtained
money other than for public compensation, but when it did the agency deposited the funds into the U.S. Treasury. States obtained government money
in 72.7% of cases, and the basis for doing so in these cases encompassed
numerous combinations of the five categories for this relief, as shown in
Table 8.

156

See 12 C.F.R. § 1075.100--110 (2016).
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TABLE 8. Percentage of state cases by type and amount of
net government money
Cases by type of net gov't money
(%)

Civil penalty only
17.0
Fees only
20.6
1.5
Cy pres+
Other designated only
9.2
21.4
Undesignated only
Fees + other
2.2
Civil penalty + other
3.6
Civil penalty + fees
20.4
Other combinations
4.1
100.0
Total
May not add up to I 00.0 due to rounding

$ amt. by type of net gov't money
(%)

27.4
6.9
6.0
9.6
50.0
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

100.0*

Note that the picture of state government money relief changes when
viewed by the percentage of dollars attributable to each category of government money instead of the percentage of cases in which the enforcer obtained that type of relief. Undesignated funds were obtained in 21.4% of
cases, but accounted for half of the net government money relief. The vast
majority of this undesignated money was of one of two types. Of the $70.1
million in undesignated government money obtained by the state enforcers,
$35.8 million, or 51.1 %, identified no discernible basis for the relief, and
$30.3 million, or 43.2%, was money undifferentiated between fees/costs and
other designated money.
Among the multi-enforcer cases, the parties rarely designate a specific
use for government money. The typical language identifies several possible
uses, all broadly stated, but expressly leaves the final decision to the enforcers' discretion. 157
The amount of government money obtained per case in which net government money relief was awarded varied by enforcer. Large multi-enforcer
cases obtained far greater recovery amounts than other enforcer cases, followed by CFPB and then FfC cases. The lower state enforcer amounts per
case are predictable, but as with defendant size, the exceedingly small median amounts are noteworthy. Small multi-enforcer cases resolved with net
government money relief amounts between the FTC and individual state
cases.

157
See, e.g., AVC, Pointroll, Inc., A.G. Case No. OL14-3-1096, at'![ 18 (Fla. Att'y Gen.
Dec. 10, 2014) ("The Settlement payment may be used, to the extent permitted by law, for
such purposes that may include, but are not limited to civil penalties, attorneys' fees, and other
costs of investigation and litigation, or to be placed in, or applied to, the consumer protection
law enforcement fund, including future consumer protection or privacy enforcement, consumer
education, litigation or local consumer aid fund or revolving fund, used to defray the costs of
the inquiry leading hereto, or for other uses permitted by state law, at the sole discretion of
each State's Attorney General's Office.")
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TABLE 9. Mean and median net government money relief by enforcer
(millions of $)

States
CFPB
FTC

Small multi-enforcer
Large multi-enforcer

Mean net gov't money

Median net gov't money

0.34
6.05
1.24

0.012
5.00
1.23
.58
30.00

.64
102.51

The above data includes only government money that was ordered and
not suspended in any way. Neither the CFPB nor the large multi-enforcers
agreed to suspended government money as part of resolving an enforcement
action. The FfC and small multi-enforcers, however, employed this practice.
In the six FfC cases with a nominal civil penalty award, two were fully
suspended and one was partially suspended. In the nine small multi-enforcer
cases with a nominal civil penalty award, two were fully suspended.
State enforcers employed suspension of awards extensively but unevenly across the different categories of government money. States were
most likely to suspend government money relief with civil penalties, doing
so in 103 of the 232 cases in which a civil penalty was nominally obtained,
or 44.4% of cases with a nominal civil penalty award. In about half of the
cases with a suspended civil penalty, the suspension was of the entire
amount of the nominal award. The states were less likely to suspend fees,
doing so in only 7 .8% of cases. 158 State enforcers suspended all forms of
government money more often when the award was smaller. Accordingly,
the percentage of nominally awarded money suspended was much less than
the percentage of cases in which suspensions were used. While 133 of the
454 state cases with some form of nominal government money, or 29.3%,
had a full or partial suspension of that relief, only 9.1 % of the dollar amount
of government money relief was suspended. For example, state enforcers at
least partially suspended an award of "other designated money" in 21.5% of
cases, but suspended only 3.1 % of the amount nominally awarded for that
purpose.
When states obtained government money, it was most often without use
designation (i.e., any form of check to the State of X, Office of AG, Treasurer of State of X, etc. that does not state specific use of the money). The
other common use designation was a continuing fund. The continuing funds
commonly stipulated that money in those funds was to be used for consumer
education, outreach, or advocacy efforts by the AG. Of the 412 cases with
some form of net government money, 183 cases (44.4%) directed at least
some of the money to a continuing fund. 159
158

None of the six state cases with a cy pres award involved suspended obligations.
States rarely directed government money to another government agency or, even less
commonly, a non-government organization. Only the six cy pres cases involved use designations to a non-governmental entity.
159
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Public Compensation

All public UDAP enforcers obtain public compensation in a significant
share of cases. Overall, enforcers resolved cases with public compensation
in 432 of the total 688 non-default cases, or 62.8%. Rates of public compensation ranged from 39.8% for the FfC to 100.0% for the CFPB. Our study
sheds light on how enforcers structure public compensation and what is
known about the type and amount of that relief.
Enforcers used four principal methods to determine eligibility for public compensation: (1) identifying specific consumers in the resolving document to receive compensation; (2) granting compensation to complainants,
either past or future or both; (3) identifying purchasers or affected consumers and making some or all potentially eligible; and (4) giving the enforcer a
sum of money and discretion to distribute that money to affected consumers.
Table 10 shows that state enforcers used all these methods, and were alone in
relying heavily on specific identification of consumers and relief to complainants. Over half, 51.5%, of state cases distributed public compensation
through one of these types, or used both methods. Only one FfC case and
one multi-enforcer case employed either of these methods to determine eligibility. The FfC had a consistent approach: obtaining a sum of money to
distribute in its sole discretion. The agency used this method in 82.9% of
cases with public compensation. The CFPB preferred distributing relief to all
affected consumers, using this method in nine of its ten cases.
TABLE 10. Eligibility criteria for public compensation by percentage of
cases by enforcer type

Complainants only
Consumers identified
Consumers identified + complainants
Purchasers/affected consumers
Discretionary decision of enf.
Other
Cannot be discerned
Total

State

CFPB

FTC

Multi-small

Multi-large

12.7%
30.5%
7.3%
26.5%
8.1%
8.6%
6.2%
100.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
90.0%
10.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%

0.0%
2.9%
0.0%
14.3%
82.9%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
33.3%
41.7%
25.0%
0.0%
100.0%

20.0%
0.0%
0.0%
40.0%
40.0%
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%

Public enforcers generally eschewed requiring consumers to file a claim
to obtain relief. Of the 432 individual state cases with public compensation
relief, only 96, or 22.2%, required consumers to file a claim to be eligible. 160
Even in the 117 cases across state enforcers providing relief to all those

160
The actual number of public compensation claims processes might be higher if enforcers with discretion over the distribution of funds later required consumers to submit claims.
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purchasing or affected by conduct, only 32, or 27.4%, of cases required a
claim by the consumer for eligibility . 161
The resolving document mentions later private actions following public
compensation in 175 individual state cases, 40.5% of cases with _public compensation. In 168 cases, 96%, the resolving document expressly states that
later private claims are not precluded. In the remaining 7 cases, 4%, a consumer was required to submit an opt-in claim form with release to obtain the
public compensation. Other than the seven opt-in cases, no case in our
database resulted iri a final disposition stating that consumers would be precluded from bringing a later private claim. No multi-enforcer case required a
release, and ten of seventeen multi-enforcer cases with public compensation
expressly reserved all private claims. Similarly, no CFPB case required a
release and eight of ten cases expressly reserved private claims. 162
Unlike the recovery of government money, we could not establish the
dollar amount of compensation in each case. In thirty-seven cases, or 8.6%
of the 432 cases with public compensation, the enforcer obtained only nonmonetary relief. 163 Such relief primarily consisted of contract rescission,
amending of credit reports, and ceasing of debt collection. Of the remaining
395 cases of public compensation with money relief, we were able to determine a known dollar amount for all consumers receiving this compensation
in 59.7% of cases, and were unable to determine any dollar amount in 25.1 %
of cases. In the remaining 15.2% of cases we were able to determine a dollar
amount for some but not all consumers, or the data was otherwise incomplete, such as a known dollar amount for an initial fund but with a defendant
obligation to replenish the fund if it proved inadequate for the planned public compensation. The percentage of known public compensation for all consumers was similar across enforcers, with the exception of small multienforcers.164 In reporting public compensation dollars, we use here all known
dollar amounts. 165

161
One of ten CFPB cases required consumers to submit a claim form to be eligible for
public compensation. Whether claim forms were required in FTC and multi-enforcer cases is
difficult to discern because of the high percentage of cases distributing public compensation in
the discretion of the enforcer. Four of seventeen multi-enforcer cases and three of thirty-five
FTC cases indicated a claim form requirement.
162
The FTC neither required a release nor mentioned preservation of private claims in any
resolved case.
163
In an additional fifty-nine cases, or 13.6% of all cases with public compensation, the
enforcer obtained both monetary and non-monetary relief. For example, the CFPB required
amending of credit reports in four cases in which it also obtained monetary relief for
consumers.
164
The percentage of cases with public compensation in which we determined a known
dollar amount for all consumers was as follows: States (53.8%), CFPB (60.0%), FTC (68.6%),
small multi-enforcer (33.3%) and large multi-enforcer (60.0%).
165
Included in public compensation are three state cases in which we included as a known
amount estimates of public compensation provided in the resolving document. One case had
estimated relief of $4,000,000 and the other two cases totaled $85,625 in estimated relief.
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The dollar amount of known public compensation per case broken
down by enforcer is similar to the results for government money. The median recovery for state enforcers, again, is noticeably small.
TABLE 11. Mean and median known public compensation dollar relief by
enforcer (millions of $)

States
CFPB
FfC
Multi-small
Multi-large

Mean Public Compensation $ Median Public Compensation $
.37
.015
21.89

6.83
5.91

709.33

21.20
5.00
2.59
315.00

The number of consumers receiving public compensation and the dollar
amount per consumer was not evident from the documents examined in substantial numbers of cases other than with state enforcers. In state cases, we
were able to determine the number of consumers receiving relief in 141
cases, with 108 (or 76.6%) of those cases providing relief to consumers by
specifically identifying them in the resolving document. The average number
of consumers receiving relief in these 141 cases was 125 and the median
number was 8.
We determined the dollar amount of relief per consumer in 128 state
cases, again heavily weighted to cases providing relief to specifically identified consumers. In 42 of those cases, all consumers received the same fixed
dollar amount of relief, with an average payment of $3010 and a median of
$1000. In the remaining 86 cases, the amount per consumer varied. The
mean and median for the consumer receiving the highest dollar amount in
these 86 cases was $6030 and $2431, respectively, while the mean and median for the lowest dollar amount was $648 and $250, respectively. While
these per consumer payment amounts are not typically large enough for an
economically viable individual private right of action, these amounts are
greater than one imagines when thinking of "small dollar" consumer cases.
In 8 cases, at least some consumers received $20,000 or more.
Public enforcers do not often appear to settle for public compensation
that is a partial amount of the consumer loss. We were able to form a judgment about the amount of public compensation as a percentage of either
purchaser payment or consumer loss in 140 cases. 166 In only 2 of these 140
cases did the enforcer obtain less than 100% of the purchase price, while in 5
cases the recovery exceeded 100% of the consumer payment or loss. 167
166
We formed a judgment concerning the percentage recovery of payment or loss in the
following number of cases by enforcer, which represented the indicted percentage of cases
with public compensation by enforcer: States - 130 (35. l %), FfC - 3 (8.6%), CFPB - 3
(30.0%), Multi-Small - 1 (8.3%), and Multi-Large - 3 (60.0%).
167
Consent Decree, Washington v. Dish Network LLC, No. 14-2-10401-4 (Wash. King
Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2014) (distributing $1 million to consumers after full refund contingent on
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ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES

While the data may have many uses, our focus is enforcement. How do
the various public enforcers exercise their considerable discretion under state
and federal UDAP laws? To answer this question we identify and describe
different strategies of public UDAP enforcement, before turning in Part VII
to implications of enforcers adopting multiple strategies for the enforcement
of laws that are substantially similar. We employ the concept of an "enforcement strategy" to mean a distinct pattern of UDAP enforcement demonstrated by one or more enforcers who exercise their discretion to enforce a
state or federal UDAP law. The enforcers, however, are not all similarlysituated. In particular, the two federal agencies differ in terms of both the
scope of their jurisdiction and the scope of their UDAP authority from the
state enforcers. Therefore, we take into account different factors to identify
enforcement strategies among the federal enforcers than we do among the
state enforcers. We begin with the two federal enforcers and then tum to the
states.
A.

Federal Enforcement Strategies

Among the federal enforcers, we look to a few case variables with
power to draw meaningful distinctions among the cases and shed light on
enforcement. We focus on six variables with federal enforcers: the type of
defendant, whether an individual, an entity, or both; the size of the largest
entity defendant; the type of relief, whether injunctive relief, public compensation, or some form of government money; the size of monetary relief, including both public compensation and government money; the forum in
which the enforcer brings the case, whether judicial or administrative; and
the means of resolution, such as a contractual settlement or a court order.
Each variable reflects the enforcers' exercise of discretion and each illuminates something important about that exercise of discretion: the first two
shed light on the targets; the next two shed light on the relief; and the last
two shed light on the process for obtaining relief against the targets. Among
the federal enforcers, consistency across these case variables was so high
that the data allowed us to identify distinct case types.

amount of total claims); Assurance of Discontinuance, New York v. Prestige Auto., Inc., No.
14-187 (Aug. 18, 2014) (consumers eligible for full refund plus 9% interest); Assurance of
Voluntary Compliance, Michigan v. Ferrellgas, Inc., No. 14-1070 (Mich. Ingham County Cir.
Ct. Sept. 18, 2014) (150% of payment refund); Settlement Agreement, Michigan v. Amerigas
Partners, LP, No. 14-0248 (Mich. Berrien County Cir. Ct. Oct. 16, 2014) (150% of payment
refund); Administrative Consent Order, Ace Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008
(consumers to receive 101.3% of payments made to defendant).
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CFPB Strategy

The CFPB enforcement strategy is plain from the presentation of the
aggregate data. Our data on the CFPB compared to other categories of enforcers was relatively thin-ten cases-but the case variables were so consistent across the ten cases that it seems fair to conclude that CFPB had a
standard approach to UDAP enforcement represented by a single case type.
Every CFPB UDAP action in 2014 was against a sizeable entity and resulted
in an injunction, public compensation, and a civil penalty. In eight of the ten
cases the amount of the civil penalty was $2.75 million or more, with a mean
slightly over $6 million and a median at exactly $5 million. The civil penalty
was deposited in the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund in every case. The CFPB also
consistently obtained substantial public compensation. The public compensation often involved a massive return of money to consumers, with the
CFPB using varied approaches to determine the type and distribution of this
relief. Seven of the ten cases provided money relief for all affected consumers without any action on their part. This enforcement strategy is consistent
with Peterson's recently published empirical review of all CFPB enforcement actions to date. 168
2.

FTC Strategy

Unlike the CFPB, which uniformly presented a single case type across
all six variables, the FTC commonly brought two distinct case types in addition to an assortment of other cases with some similarities but considerable
variation. We first summarize and then look at key case variables that distinguish these two case types.
The first category we call Type A, or Injunction Only, cases. The
agency brought these actions against a single, often large, corporation for
which the sole remedy was an administrative order designed to restrain the
specific conduct at issue. These cases almost uniformly stated that the injunctive restrictions and reporting requirements continue for a period of
twenty years. Type A cases were the most common, constituting forty-eight,
or slightly more than half of the FTC cases resolved in 2014. 169
A second category we call Type B, or Pervasive Fraud, cases. These
thirty-four FTC actions targeted widespread fraud, often by a large number
of smaller entity defendants and related individuals. These cases often resulted in a judicial injunction that banned the defendants from engaging in a
168
Peterson, supra note 29, at 1092. Also, consistent with Peterson's study is our finding
that deception was often pleaded in conjunction with an unfairness pleading. Peterson's data
also matches our findings that the enforcement actions under UDAAP resulted in both public
compensation and civil penalty money.
169
The Type A cases included a series of thirteen cases with one pattern, which were
enforcement actions filed on the same day alleging deceptive website pledges by companies to
comply with U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Framework for ensuring the protection of personal data
transferred outside the European Union.
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certain business sector, and often froze the defendants' assets, with the
money obtained typically directed to the FTC for public compensation at the
agency's discretion. 110
The agency's action against Finmaestros, a Florida-based company that
claimed to provide computer security and technical support services, and
several related individuals and entities, is representative of Type B. In its
complaint, the agency alleged that defendants would cold-call consumers,
often falsely claiming affiliation with a well-known firm such as Microsoft,
and persuade the consumers to purchase computer security software, otherwise available free on the internet, to address non-existent threats. 171 As a
result, the agency obtained a default judgment permanently banning the defendants from the marketing or sale of computer security and computer-related technical support services. 172 In addition, the agency also obtained a
judgment for nearly $1.4 million for public compensation at the agency's
discretion and a freeze on the defendants' assets. 173
A small number of other FTC enforcement actions, twelve cases,
rounded out the 2014 data. These cases involved some form of monetary
relief, did not target pervasive fraud, and sometimes involved larger companies than FTC Type B Cases. For example, the agency obtained orders
prohibiting both Apple 174 and Google 175 from allowing children to make inapp purchases without parental consent and requiring the firms to reimburse
harmed consumers. As detailed below, Type A and Type B cases consistently
differ across several key variables.
Defendants. 94.4% of Type A defendants were entities, while 64.5% of
Type B defendants were entities. The FTC brought Type A cases against
larger entities, with the highest medians for annual revenue and employee
numbers. In contrast, Type B cases mostly involved small targets, with defendant size similar to the most common state enforcement actions. These
cases also were characterized by a disproportionately large number of defendants per case, reflecting the FTC's effort in many of these cases to restrain a fraud coordinated among numerous individuals and entities. Table
12 shows defendant numbers and size by these two case types.

170

Six of the Type B cases involved pattern case default judgments obtained on the same

171

Complaint at 6-9, FfC v. Finmaestros, LLC, No. 12-7195 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012).
FfC v. Finmaestros, LLC, No. 12-7195, 2014 WL 3743964, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July IO,

day.
172

2014).
173

Id. at *5.

174

Apple, Inc., FfC File No. 112-3108, 2014 WL 1330287, at *7-*9 (F.T.C. Mar. 25,

2014).
175

2014).

Google, Inc., FfC File No. 122-3237, 2014 WL 6984156, at *8-*10 (F.T.C. Dec. 2,
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TABLE 12. Defendant data for FfC Type A and Type B cases

#of cases
Mean # of entity defendants I case
Mean # of individual defendants I case
Mean # of total defendants I case
% of largest entity defendants with no known size data or dissolved
Largest entity defendant in case annual revenue - mean
Largest entity defendant in case annual revenue - median
Largest entity defendant in case # employees - mean
Largest entity defendant in case # employees - median

Type A

Type B

48
1.2
0.1
1.3
6.2%
788.2 million
17.8 million
2,017
66

34
3.3
2.0
5.3
14.7%
3.93 million
0.64 million
34
12

Litigation and Forum. Type B cases required litigation in federal court.
Of the thirty-four Type B cases, twenty-three (67.6%) were in litigation for
more than 180 days. The median time from filing to resolution was 395 days
in Type B cases. All but one Type B case was filed and resolved in federal
court. Type A cases were exactly the opposite. All but one Type A case was
settled prior to filing, and all but two were administrative actions before the
FfC.
Injunctive Relief 176 Reliance on injunctive relief as the primary remedy
perhaps most distinguishes FTC enforcement from the other UDAP enforcers. Over half of FTC cases obtained only injunctive relief and are therefore
Type A cases. Only one other UDAP enforcer, a state administrative agency,
so eschewed money relief. 177 In Type B cases, the FTC obtained a ban on
conduct in twenty of the twenty-eight non-default cases. The FfC obtained a
ban on Type B defendants engaging in any business conduct in that sector in
thirteen cases, a ban on using a certain form of sales conduct in five cases
and both types of bans in two cases. 178 No injunctive ban was issued in a
Type A case or any of the twelve cases not defined by either Types A or B.
Money Relief By definition, the FfC did not obtain any money relief in
Type A cases. 179 Only three Type B cases resulted in net government money.
The amount of net penalties ranged from $490,000 to $1.5 million. 180 The
agency obtained public compensation in every Type B case. Table 13 shows
the amount of public compensation in Type B cases and in the twelve cases
that were neither Type A nor Type B, all of which also resulted in public
compensation. As with all FTC public compensation, this relief was almost
exclusively in the form of a lump sum to be distributed at the agency's discretion. The primary difference between Type B public compensation and
the remaining cases is that in Type B cases the FfC frequently obtained a
176

Data for relief in FfC cases is reported only for non-default cases. See supra Part V.D.
See infra Part Vl.B.6.
The FfC also obtained a ban on any business conduct in a defined sector in the six
Type B default cases.
179
In two Type A cases, the FfC assessed and fully suspended a civil penalty.
180
In one Type B case, the FfC suspended $710,000 of a $1 .2 million civil penalty, resulting in the $490,000 net penalty. The agency did not obtain net government money in nontyped cases, although one case assessed and fully suspended a $2 million penalty.
177

178
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comprehensive asset freeze, appointed a receiver, or the settlement included
a provision requiring defendants to identify all assets and making the release
from prosecution dependent on the accuracy of this disclosure. This structure
of relief reflects a broad and forceful movement by the FTC to shut down a
fraudulent scheme. In fourteen Type B cases, the FTC relied partially or
solely on the asset freeze to fund public compensation in that case, sometimes suspending an otherwise nominal amount of public compensation. In
eleven of these cases, the FTC established a much smaller known amount for
public compensation and supplemented this amount with money recovered
by the asset freeze. The small size of Type B defendants, and the high percentage of entity defendants either dissolved or of unknown size, render dollar numbers for public compensation less meaningful than the asset freeze.
TABLE 13. Public compensation data for FTC Type B and non-typed cases
TypeB
# of cases (non-default) w/ public compensation
# of cases w/ known amount of public compensation

Known
Known
Known
Known

mean amount of public compensation
median amount of public compensation
minimum amount of public compensation
maximum amount of public compensation

# of cases with asset freeze
% of cases with asset freeze
# of cases with receiver appointed
% of cases with receiver appointed

# of cases with defendant asset statement
% of cases with defendant asset statement

B.

Non-Typed
Cases

28
18

12

8.76 million
560,000
12,675
90.51 million

8.14 million
1.75 million
230,000
32.50 million

13
46.4%

0
0.0%
0
0.0%
0
0.0%

10

35.7%
19
67.8%

10

State Enforcement Strategies

The aggregate data make clear that state enforcers pursue cases against
a large number of very small actors, yet also bring actions against some of
the nation's largest companies. Less apparent in the overall data are the
starkly different approaches to enforcement among the states, and the often
surprising consistency among states that adopt the same enforcement strategy. This section begins with a brief explanation of how we identify enforcement strategies among the states followed by an overview of seven state
strategies. We then disaggregate the state data to show the salient characteristics of each strategy.
1.

Explanation and Overview of the State Strategies

While we identified federal enforcement strategies based only on the
exercise of discretion as reflected in case variables, we look to three factors
to identify state enforcement strategies. In addition to case variables, we
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also take into account the volume of cases an enforcer decides to bring and
an enforcer's participation in leadership of multi-enforcer actions. The first
factor, case volume, measures the total number of cases an enforcer resolved
in 2014. This factor alone draws a line nearly down the middle of the state
enforcers, separating no-volume and low-volume enforcers on the one hand
from high-volume enforcers on the other hand.
As with the federal enforcers, we also look to case variables, including
the type of defendant, the size of the largest entity defendant, the type of
relief obtained by the enforcers, the size of monetary relief, the use of government money, the structure of public compensation, and sometimes a few
other variables, such as the use of outside counsel. Our application of these.
variables to the cases, however, is different with the state enforcers than the
federal enforcers. Federal enforcement readily demonstrated distinct case
types. For the state enforcers, we identified similarities between enforcers,
rather than within cases brought by the same enforcer, in discerning patterns
in the case variables.
In addition to case volume and the case variables, the third and final
factor that informs our state enforcement strategies is leadership in multienforcer actions. As explained earlier, multi-enforcer actions have become a
dominant feature on the landscape of public enforcement. 181 These cases are
often highly consequential, achieving remedies that shape conduct and compensate consumers across the nation. Mere participation in these actions,
however, reveals little about how enforcers use their powers. Participants
may lend nothing more than a signature to a settlement agreement while the
cost of failing to sign-on may mean the loss of millions of dollars. More
illuminating is leadership in multi-enforcer actions as measured by membership in the executive or monitoring committee. The enforcers who fill this
role are sometimes the leaders who bring the case and always the leaders
who move it forward and bring it to a close. 182
The state enforcement strategies divide into two groups based on case
volume. The four low-volume strategies are as follows:
Strategy I: Non-Enforcers. Nine state enforcers made little or no use of
their UDAP authority during the study period.
Strategy 2: Low-Volume Enforcers. Another nine states resolved at least
two but no more than five cases, with at least one case resulting in total
monetary relief greater than the median.

181

See supra notes 147, 161, and 164, and accompanying text.
These three factors do not always have equal weight in defining our enforcement strategies. For example, sometimes the mere volume of cases is determinative and the case variables inconsequential. The defining characteristics reflected in case variables have less
relevance among enforcers who are not exercising their UDAP authority in a significant number of cases.
182
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Strategy 3: Low-Volume Plus Enforcers. An additional four states also
resolved at least two but no more than ten cases, with one (but only
one) quite large case resulting in total money relief greater than $1 million, which is at the 92.5% level for all cases.
Strategy 4: Outsourcers. The most distinctive enforcement strategy was
adopted by three states with a small number of cases heavily relying on
outside counsel to sue very large companies for sizeable awards of "undesignated" government money, along with two other states employing
a similar approach.

The three higher case volume strategies are as follows:
Strategy 5: Street Cops. These six states completed a much larger number of cases, mainly against individuals or tiny businesses, and obtained
small money awards, often dedicating amounts to specific consumers
identified in the resolving document.
Strategy 6: Street Cops Plus. A group of five states similarly resolved a
large number of cases with the same characteristics as the Street Cops,
but also had a set of actions against larger defendants with greater
money relief, and were more likely than any group except Strategy 7
enforcers to lead multi-enforcer actions.
Strategy 7: Heavies. Nine states resolved a high volume of cases disproportionally against larger entities for larger money relief, and dominated leadership of multi-enforcer cases.

Lastly, four states were outliers and did not fit any strategy, although
these states shared some common characteristics. Case volume for these
states was mid-range (nine to twelve). Three of the four states relied
predominantly on one form of relief, with each of the three states relying on
a different form of relief than the other two states.
Figure 8 underscores the breakdown of the enforcers into strategies relating to the volume of cases. The total number of cases by each strategy is
measured by the bar graph associated with the left scale of Figure 8, while
the line and right scale identify the number of cases per enforcer using each
enforcement strategy. Throughout this subpart, we designate the colors used
in Figure 8 for each strategy.
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Strategies 1-3: Low-Volume Enforcers

Strategies 1-3 are twenty-five states that resolved a small number of
cases; an average of less than three and with only two of the states (North
Carolina and West Virginia) completing more than five cases in 2014. The
twenty-five states constituting the three lower-volume strategies accounted
for almost half of the state enforcers and resolved almost exactly 10% of the
cases.
Nine state enforcers make little use of their state UDAP laws, and these
nine states are classified in Strategy I as Non-Enforcers. Four of these states
(District of Columbia, Kentucky, South Dakota, and Tennessee) resolved no
UDAP cases in 2014. Three of these states had only one case, and two states
had two or three cases that resolved with dollar recoveries less than half the
mean and median for all state enforcers. Strategy 2 consists of another nine
states with slightly higher case volume and at least one case with total
money recovery greater than the median. Three of these low-volume states
(Alabama, Nebraska, and Hawaii) obtained money recoveries at or near the
90% decile, ranging from $246,000 to $510,000. 184
The third low-volume strategy was employed by four state enforcers,
each resolving only one case with a dollar recovery in excess of $1 million.
California's large case resulted in 28.4 million in public compensation. Exclude this case and the four Strategy 3 enforcers nonetheless recovered total
money as a result of the big cases more than four times greater than the other
eighteen low-volume enforcers. 1ss
Leadership in multi-enforcer cases tracks well with the identified state
enforcement strategies. Figure 10 shows multi-enforcer leadership as measured by the average number of leadership positions per state in each enforcer strategy. 186 These measures are consistent with substantially less
engagement in UDAP enforcement by low-volume states.

184
We placed Michigan in Strategy 2 rather than in Strategy 1 because its two cases
obtained public compensation in an unknown amount but which required broad-based relief to
gas customers that plainly would exceed the median total dollar recovery for all state enforcer
cases.
185
One of the Strategy 3 enforcers, North Carolina, is an uneasy fit in the low enforcement categories, and is best described as falling between a Strategy 3 and Strategy 7 enforcer.
The attorney general resolved ten cases in 2014, twice as many cases as any other Strategy 1-3
enforcer other than West Virginia. Four of these cases, however, were default judgments, accounting for more than one-third of the eleven default cases with Strategy 1-3 enforcers. In
addition to being the most active of the low-volume enforcers in multi-enforcer leadership, it
also paired with the FfC and two other states in a small multi-enforcer case, and with the
CFPB and one other state in another small multi-enforcer case.
186
Two of the Strategy 3 enforcers, California and North Carolina, each participated in the
leadership of three multi-enforcer cases, accounting for the total participation of Strategy 3
enforcers in multi-enforcer leadership and 60% of the total leadership for all Strategy 1-3
enforcers. The percentage of states in each enforcement strategy that assumed leadership in
two or more multi-enforcer cases shows almost an identical distribution across the enforcement strategies.
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Strategy 4 Outsourcer cases share a number of striking differences with
other state UDAP enforcement actions across five case variables, as described below. 188
Exceptionally and consistently large money awards. The money recovery in Outsourcer cases was far greater than in any other strategy. The $53.2
million in total money relief by these enforcers amounted to 22.9% of all
money relief in state UDAP enforcement. The median total money relief of
$2.2 million was more than 100 times the median in all state cases. Outsourcer states used outside counsel to obtain very large awards, but with the
exception of New Mexico, did not substantially undertake the more routine
enforcement work common among state enforcers.
Focus on government money relief to the neglect of other forms of relief Unlike other state enforcers, Strategy 4 enforcers relied almost exclusively on government money as a remedy. Government money was obtained
in all cases, but government money was the only remedy in nine of the
nineteen Outsourcer cases. Relief was limited to just government money in
only six other state enforcers cases across the entire database. Of the ten
Outsourcer cases using outside counsel and the two similar South Carolina
cases, injunctive relief was a remedy in just three cases, or 25.0%, compared
to the average of 95.8% in all state cases.
Government money recovery was largely undesignated. Unlike other
enforcers, most of the government money recovered in Strategy 4 cases was
a lump sum with undesignated basis for recovery. Moreover, the government
money recovered by Strategy 4 enforcers was overwhelmingly given to the
state attorney general for discretionary use. The remaining government
money was applied to a continuing fund held by the state.
Large, entity defendants. Large money awards flow from large defendants, so unsurprisingly the defendants in Strategy 4 cases were generally
much larger than defendants in any other strategy. Table 15 compares Outsourcer defendant size to numbers for all state cases.

188
We provide data on all nineteen cases for this group of enforcers. The differences
between case variables for these enforcers and all other state enforcers would be even starker if
we excluded the seven cases (mostly from New Mexico) brought by staff attorneys.
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TABLE 15. Defendant size (when known) - Strategy 4 (Outsourcers)
compared to all cases

% of defendants that are entities

Largest entity defendant annual revenue - mean
Largest entity defendant annual revenue - median
Largest entity defendant # employees - mean
Largest entity defendant # employees - median

All Cases
55.0%

Strategy 4
87.3%

$2,622,362,000

$21,942,000,000

$592,000

$4,348,250,000

8,543

50,249

6

8,660

Other attributes. Several other Outsourcers attributes were also distinctive. Six of the fourteen cases, including both of the South Carolina cases,
were against pharmaceutical companies. Across the state enforcement cases,
settlement was almost always effected by an A VC or a Consent Order, either
judicial or administrative. Strategy 4 cases, however, were resolved by contractual settlement in eleven of nineteen cases, compared to just 3.0% of all
state cases. 189
4.

Strategies 5-6: Street Cops and Street Cops (Plus)

Street Cops are the antithesis of the Outsourcers. They are high volume,
small target enforcers. The eleven state enforcers in Strategies 5 and 6 accounted for 355 of the resolved cases, or 52.9% of the state case total. Yet
these two enforcement strategies recovered only $11.3 million in total net
government money, 8.7% of the total state recovery, and $85.0 million in
known amounts of public compensation, or 8.3% of the total state recovery.
The lower known dollar recovery for public compensation came despite
these states having a lower rate of obtaining public compensation in unknown amounts-15.4% compared to an overall rate of 22.7%. As a result,
the mean and median recoveries of these enforcers were much lower, as
shown in Figures 11 and 12.

189
One contract term, appearing in a South Carolina settlement, is noteworthy: "the State
or its attorneys agree to give counsel for Allergan at least ten (10) days written notice of any
such request, along with a copy of the request, to afford Allergan the ability to take steps it
deems appropriate to resist disclosure. The State or its attorneys will not produce the Settlement Agreement prior to the return date of the request, unless otherwise required by state law
or court order, in order to provide Allergan an opportunity to challenge the request." Settlement Agreement between South Carolina, Allergan, Inc. & Allergan USA, Inc. (Jan. 23, 2014).
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5--6

Street Cop states also used different criteria for determining eligibility
for public compensation. In over 75% of cases resolved by Street Cop states,
consumers obtained public compensation when the enforcer specifically
identified the consumers in the resolving document or by filing a complaint
with the enforcer or defendant. Other state enforcers more often distributed
public compensation to any consumer who either purchased the product or
service or whom the defendant harmed.

190

For a description of defendant size categories, see supra Table 2.
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Strategy 5 enforcers and for all other state enforcers. But Street Cop Plus
enforcers sometimes engage in enforcement activity or achieve results that
more closely parallel Strategy 7 Heavies. For example, when the number of
consumers receiving public compensation was identifiable, Strategy 5 enforcers obtained compensation for a median of three consumers, Strategy 6
for a median of thirteen consumers, and the median number of consumers in
all other cases was sixteen.
Most importantly, Strategy 6 enforcers had frequency of multi-enforcer
leadership close to the dominant role of Strategy 7 enforcers. As shown in
Figure 10 above, the Strategy 6 Street Cop Plus enforcers participated in
multi-enforcer leadership an average of slightly less than three times per
enforcer, compared with slightly more than three times per enforcer for the
Strategy 7 enforcers. Strategy 5 Street Cops averaged less than one leadership role per enforcer, similar to the low volume enforcers. Furthermore,
Strategy 6 enforcers sometimes engage in specific enforcement activity that
more closely parallels Strategy 7. For instance, although states generally obtained a freeze on defendant assets at a much lower rate than the FfC, Strategy 7 enforcers (particularly New York) and Strategy 6 enforcers
(particularly Arizona) accounted for a substantial proportion of state asset
freezes. Of the sixteen cases in which states froze assets in some form, eight
(50.0%) were Strategy 7 enforcers and six (37 .5%) were Strategy 6
enforcers.

5.

Strategy 7: Heavies

The Heavies and Street Cops both have high case volumes, but the former has larger recoveries per case and larger defendants. Strategy 7 enforcers obtained $113.8 million in total money recovery. This amount constitutes
49.0% of the known money recovery by state enforcers. Strategy 7 median
recoveries were four to five times the corresponding level for all other cases,
and the means were also higher.

7

7
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As noted earlier, these enforcers also dominate leadership in multi-enforcer cases. All but one of the Strategy 7 states assumed a leadership role in
two or more multi-enforcer cases. Overall, the nine Heavies accounted for
48.4% of multi-enforcer leadership.
6.

Outliers

The outliers all had mid-range case volume, from nine to twelve cases.
Three of the four outlier states predominantly obtained a single type of relief, although favoring different types. These three outliers include New
Jersey, Maine, and Wisconsin. The Maine Attorney General obtained only
public compensation with an injunction in all cases. Moreover, the state distributed public compensation to all harmed consumers in nearly all cases.
The New Jersey Attorney General focused on government money in all
cases. New Jersey obtained public compensation in addition to government
money in eight of its ten cases, but it clearly emphasized government money
in its UDAP enforcement. It obtained known amounts of public compensation in five of its ten cases, with a mean amount of $10,337 and a median of
$5932, compared to substantial government monetary recoveries averaging
$222,274 with a median of $39,326. In contrast, state enforcers overall obtained more money per case in public compensation than in government
money.
Wisconsin's administrative agency obtained only injunctive relief in the
ten cases it handled through an AVC. No enforcer other than the FfC relied
so heavily on solely injunctive relief. Two cases were brought by the Wis191

For a description of defendant size categories, see supra Table 2.
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consin Attorney General on behalf of the state administrative agency, with
one case resolving through trial and resulting in over $1 million of government money and almost $4 million of public compensation.
The fourth outlier is Connecticut. Under Connecticut UDAP law, an
administrative agency has sole discretion to bring actions, which the state
Attorney General litigates. 192 In 2014, the state resolved nine cases, obtaining injunctive relief in every case and frequently imposing a complete
ban on business in a given sector. The state also obtained public compensation in about half the individual cases in relatively small amounts. Most
notable, the state was a frequent participant in small multi-enforcer litigation, including three cases in which the FTC paired solely with Connecticut.
VII.

ThtPLICATIONS

This descriptive account of public UDAP enforcement in the United
States has implications for conceptions of public enforcement, the exercise
of public UDAP authority, and further research.
A.

Conceptions of Public Enforcement

Our project captures a snapshot of public UDAP enforcement. The enforcement strategies we identify provide a new framework for thinking
about public enforcement. In so doing, we uncover what public UDAP enforcement is, and we also begin to bring data to bear on what that enforcement is not. Scholarship cannot treat public enforcement as a unitary or
abstract concept, but must take into account the multiplicity of actual enforcement conduct.
1.

Different Enforcers Apply the Same Law with Different Results

The data we present leads to one overarching conclusion: public UDAP
enforcement by multiple enforcers leads to different strategies to enforce
very similar laws. 193 As discussed above, scholars have debated whether diversity of enforcement provides a check against non-efficient enforce-

192

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
One could argue that at least some of the differences in enforcement conduct stems
from a factor beyond the control of the enforcer: the limits on the enforcer's legal authority.
For example, the FTC rarely uses its civil penalty authority, see supra note 179, which Congress limited by statute. Nonetheless, the FTC suspended penalties in half the cases in which
the agency imposed them, and the agency obtained only injunctive relief in a large number of
cases when it also had public compensation authority. Although future research will need to
examine the role that slight differences in legal authority play, see infra Part VII.C, at first
glance the data does not suggest a correlation between difference in strategies and variations in
UDAP statutes.
193
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ment. 194 The enforcement strategies catalogued above seem to promote an
environment that takes aim at different types of fraud and different types of
actors and seeks different remedies. In other words, diversity of enforcers
does provide diverse strategies even within similar legal authority.
Even so, the variety of approaches employed is not infinite. The data
sorted into a handful of enforcement strategies. If groups of enforcers have
similar patterns as to the volume and type of cases resolved, as our strategies
tend to show, then we have a new starting point for scholars considering
normative implications of those different patterns. We can better understand
UDAP enforcement, and perhaps other principle-based enforcement, as a set
of options that can and often will produce different results depending on the
desired outcome or point of evaluation.
2.

Public Enforcement Does Not Mirror the Assumptions
Underlying Much of the Debate

Deborah Hensler called for empirical data that might tend to prove or
disprove the assumptions underlying many of the normative claims made
about state AG enforcement, specifically in consumer protection. 195 She
poses a series of questions that are unanswered by the current scholarship.
We have begun to answer some of these questions. We also can evaluate
some of the claims that have animated the normative scholarship on public
enforcement, at least as those claims apply to UDAP enforcement.
First, the data on public UDAP enforcement suggests that the analogy
between private class actions and public enforcement actions that result in
public compensation is flawed. The scholarly debate about whether to import procedural reforms originally applied to class actions depends on this
analogy. The reality of public compensation in UDAP cases, however, does
not align with private consumer class actions. A typical consumer class action involves thousands of people offered the opportunity to receive money,
often through a process that requires responding to a notice and submitting a
claim to receive a set amount of money that represents a small percentage of

194
See Barkow, supra note 64, at 15. But see Minzner, supra note 68, at 2118-19. See
generally supra Part Ill.A.
195
Hensler, supra note 8, at 58-59 ("Lemos's analysis is similarly heavy on theory and
light on empirics-indeed, her article does not contain any empirical data about the nature and
frequency of the litigation that concerns her. How many state attorney general suits are there
and what proportion seek individual monetary remedies (as contrasted with reimbursement for
state expenses or contributions to state activities)? In suits in which state attorneys general
pursue individual remedies, is the typical value of individual class members' claims large
enough to make individual litigation practical, or could such claims only be pursued otherwise
in much-castigated and increasingly endangered private class actions? Do empirical data support the proposition that state citizens' and class members' interests frequently diverge? How
often do federal agencies and private class representatives join state attorney general actions?
Are there differences in outcomes when state attorneys general act alone rather than with
others?").
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the purchase price or loss. 196 Only a small portion of UDAP cases brought by
public enforcers fits this description. Instead, public UDAP enforcement is
best characterized by a multiplicity of approaches to determining eligibility,
usually with no requirement of a claim, and routinely with full compensation
for loss.
Likewise, our data presented no evidence that preclusion of private
claims following public compensation is a concern. No case resolved with
the court or by settlement indicated preclusion of private claims without the
consumer executing a release. And the number of cases in which consumers
were asked to release claims as the price of obtaining public compensation
was tiny-only seven individual state cases. Setting aside the legal accuracy
of the claim that class procedures should be imposed on public enforcement
because of later preclusion of private claims for money damages, 197 our data
shows this concern is merely theoretical. 198
Second, the fervor about outside counsel needs re-evaluation, at least as
applied to public UDAP enforcement. Many scholars assume or imply that
use of outside counsel is a common practice. 199 Outsourced UDAP enforcement, however, appears rare. Only ten cases, representing 1.5% of state
UDAP cases in our dataset, evidenced outside counsel. Moreover, two
states-Mississippi and Nevada-brought eight of these ten cases. The evidence supports that outsourced cases are different in kind than most state
cases, yielding larger money results from larger defendants. The evidence
does not support, however, that outsourcing is common.
Third, our data complicates claims about the motivations of public enforcers, the claim that state AGs make enforcement decisions based on political gain or supplementing state coffers. An attorney general motivated in
this manner would presumably enforce against large companies, but our data
suggests that almost all AGs, even the Heavies, bring a significant number of
cases against tiny entities. Public enforcers can "trumpet" large money recoveries, 200 especially money distributed to voters in the form of public compensation. But AGs are at least, if not more, concerned about injunctive

196
See Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 418-20 (2014).
197
Compare Lemos, Aggregate Litigation, supra note 15, at 531--42 with Cox, Public
Enforcement, supra note 50, at 2336-49.
198
See supra Part V.D.4.
199
See, e.g., Lemos, Privatizing, supra note 58, at 532 ("State attorneys general routinely
hire outside counsel to handle aspects of the state's litigation work"); Lemos, State Enforcement, supra note 15, at 735 ("State attorneys general frequently reach out to private counsel to
assist with the state's business"); Lemos & Minzner, supra note 58, at 862--63 ("Complicating
matters further, public and private enforcers increasingly work together ... where public
enforcement agencies rely on private contingency-fee lawyers to litigate their cases.").
200
See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 58, at 857.
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relief, which is the one form of relief all public enforcers consistently
obtain. 201
Fourth, Lemos and Minzner describe a "puzzling pattern in public enforcement: the tendency of many agencies to announce large financial recoveries while failing to collect them" and to bring cases against "judgmentproof' defendants. 202 Our data generally reflect the opposite in public UDAP
enforcement. The FTC routinely engages in broad asset freezes and imposes
receiverships. State AGs frequently have complicated payment schedules requiring partial payments over time. Default judgment rates are low, generally around 6%, with only a handful of Strategy 5 Street Cop enforcers with
high rates. 203
Fifth, and finally, at least one claim pressed by the critics finds support
in our data: that enforcers use continuing funds. Over 44% of state cases
with net government money deposited at least some money in a continuing
fund. It is unclear whether use of those funds aligns with other conduct as
neatly as the scholarship implies, however. Our data do not show obvious
support for the notion that use of continuing funds by a state AG substantially impacts enforcement work. 204
As these five observations suggest, the data must shape our conceptions
of public enforcement. Only by first recognizing what public UDAP enforcement is (and what it is not), can we begin to address secondary questions
regarding (1) why it is what it is and (2) whether it should be what it is.
B.

The Exercise of Public UDAP Authority

This study also has implications for the exercise of public UDAP authority: namely, it provides a footing for assessment and accountability.
Some enforcers may conduct regular evaluations of their enforcement practices. Many enforcers, however, are likely not identifying goals, implementing a strategy, or assessing their work to determine if they are achieving
their goals. Our study can provide a means of assessment or further data to
enrich ongoing evaluations.
In addition to identifying what strategy a particular enforcer reflects
and how that strategy compares to others, an enforcer can also identify spe201
Cf id. at 857 ("[F]inancially motivated agencies are apt to ... reduce their focus on
nonmonetary remedies .... "); see also id. at 899 (claiming that public enforcers will readily
settle for higher damage awards rather than injunctions banning defendant's practices).
202
Lemos & Minzner, supra note 58, at 875, 884.
203
Indiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah have the highest rate of default
judgments.
204
For instance, Low-Volume Enforcers use continuing funds at a much lower rate, but so
do the Heavies. One would suspect total government money recoveries would be higher when
the enforcer was obtaining money for a continuing fund, but the mean in such cases was
almost identical and the median was slightly lower than that for all non-default cases by state
enforcers: $I 0,097 for continuing fund cases and $11 ,985 for all non-default state cases. Nonetheless, this is a causative question needing careful analysis, including a distinction between
types of continuing funds.
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cific practices employed by others that might prove valuable. For example, a
number of state enforcers suspend government money awards, which come
due if the defendant breaches the agreement. 205 The FTC makes expansive
use of asset freezes, while the state enforcers almost ignore this option. 206
Some state enforcers provide public compensation only for individuals who
file a complaint with the enforcer's office, while other states broadly compensate all harmed consumers. 207 CFPB obtains all forms of relief in all
cases. 208 While the United States' disaggregated system of consumer protection allows for wide innovation, the laboratory of democracy only functions
if other enforcers are watching and aware.
Furthermore, this study provides at least the initial means to hold public
enforcers accountable. As stated earlier, many state enforcers are doing little
to enforce their UDAP law - including, at least in 2014, some of the largest
states in the nation, such as California, Michigan, and Virginia. 209 Some AGs
who tout large multi-state monetary awards to the media may do nothing
more than offer a signature, while a mere handful of state enforcers shoulder
the difficult and critical work. A robust accountability tool would require
data over multiple years, but this study is a start.
C.

Further Research

This study opens multiple avenues for further research. As stated in the
Introduction, our goal in this paper is descriptive: to identify the many ways
public UDAP enforcers exercise their considerable discretion. Questions
quickly arise, however, that move beyond description to causation: what factors explain the various enforcement outcomes?210 Some factors, such as legal authority and perhaps agency funding, may act outside the enforcer's
discretion. 211 A longer list of factors may explain outcomes by acting upon
the enforcer's discretion, such as citizen ideology; electoral pressures;
agency culture; partisan affiliation; campaign contributions; the means by
which the chief enforcer secures his or her job; and levels of private enforcement, local public enforcement, and consumer protection advocacy. These
questions await further investigation.

205

See supra Part V.D.4.
See supra Part VI.
207
See Cox supra, note 50, at 2354-59, and accompanying text.
208
See 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a)(2)(C) (2012).
209
See supra Part Vl.B.1.
21
° Colin Provost has explored similar questions with regard to multi-state actions. See
Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State AG Behavior in Multi-State Litigation, supra note
92; Provost, Entrepreneurship, supra note 592.
211
The obvious example here is that the FrC rarely uses its civil penalty authority, see
supra note 179, and has restricted authority to impose such penalties. Nonetheless, the FrC
suspended penalties in half the cases where the agency imposed them, and it obtained only
injunctive relief in more than half its cases when the agency also had public compensation
authority. See id.; see also supra note 180.
206
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In addition, this study raises important normative questions. How
should a public UDAP enforcer exercise discretion given limited public resources? What cases should UDAP enforcers bring and what factors should
shape case selection? As this study suggests, multi-enforcer cases have outsized influence, at least in terms of compensating harmed consumers and
obtaining government money. Should state enforcers focus on larger targets?
If so, what happens to the fraud and deception furthered by individuals and
small entities that the Street Cops target? Is anyone left to enforce the law
here if state enforcers set their sights elsewhere? Might less expensive, more
efficient means of enforcement develop to address these harms? Further research must explore these and other questions, always tethered to a datainformed account of how, in fact, enforcers exercise their powers.

